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Federal Parole and Federal Sentencing: A Report
on the Present and Some Thoughts for the Future
David J. Gottlieb*
INTRODUCTION

In the past fifteen years an almost unanimous consensus has developed over the need for sentencing' reform. Critics have maintained that the unregulated discretion currently granted judges
fosters extensive and unwarranted disparity in the treatment of
like cases.2 Commentators have condemned indeterminate parole
and sentencing procedures as morally unjustifiable,3 and as a cause
of prison unrest.' Underlying both these concerns is disillusionment with the rehabilitative ideal.6
* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law and Director, Kansas Defender
Project. B.A. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, Georgetown University Law Center.
This article grows out of the author's experience supervising University of Kansas law
students in hearings and appeals before the United States Parole Commission. The author
wishes to thank William Fortune, Professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law,
for his assistance with Part II of the article, Sidney A. Shapiro, Professor, University of
Kansas School of Law, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Debra Watson,
third-year student at the University of Kansas School of Law, for her valuable assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. Since the parole decision sets the actual release date for many inmates, it will be
referred to as a sentencing decision for the purposes of this article.
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENs Szavicz COMMrrrns, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 45-46 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as

STRUGGLE FOR

Jus'xcz]; D. FOGEL, WE ARE

THE LIVING PROOF: THE

JusIcE MODEL FOR CORRECIONS 193-99 (1975) [hereinafter cited as D. FOGEL]; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENENCEs: LAw WITHoUT ORDER (1972) [hereinafter cited as M. FRANKEL]; J.
MrrrORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973) [hereinafter cited as J. MrrFORDJ; N. Monuus,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974) [hereinafter cited as N. MORRIS]; P. O'DONNELL, M.
CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD AJuSr AND Emncv SmETENCING SVSTEM 1-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as P. O'DoNNELL]; A. VON HIRScH, DOING JUsTIcE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTs (1976) [hereinafter cited as A. VON HISCH].
3. STRUGGLE FOR JuSTIcE, supra note 2, at 40-47, 93-96; D. FOGEL, supra note 2, at 23848; M. FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 96-97; J. MrryoRD, supra note 2, at 79-117; N. MORRIS,
supra note 2; P. O'DONNELL, supra note 2, at 28; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 102. See
also Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScL 226, 229-32 (1959).
4. See Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity,
Determinancy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HoFSTRA L. Rsv. 89, 95-96 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman & Stover).
5. The disillusionment rests upon the concomitant beliefs that institutional programs
have not been successful in promoting rehabilitation and that rehabilitation cannot be mea-
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Considerable agreement has also developed concerning some of
the solutions required to reform the present system. Commentators have maintained that equitable sentencing decisions can be
achieved through the use of guidelines which specify a customary
range of prison terms based on the nature of the offense and the
background of the offender." The existence of definite sentencing
standards eliminates unstructured judicial discretion which, it is
argued, has produced unwarranted disparity. Because the guidelines are based upon preincarceration data, a determinate sentencing term can be imposed.
7
The 1973 publication of the United States Parole Commission
guidelines for release marked a major event in the movement for
more equitable sentences.' The guidelines, rather than attempting
to measure the magic moment of rehabilitation, predicate the re-

sured, as well as on a concern over the ethical legitimacy of coercive rehabilitation. See infra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WIKINS & P. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND
SENTENCING (1978); P. O'DONNELL, supra note 2; Hoffman & Stover, supra note 4. A differ-

ent solution to the problem of undue disparity is "fixed price" or "flat-time" sentencing. In
this scheme the legislature specifies very narrow ranges within which all sentences must be
imposed. See Hoffman & Stover, supra note 4, at 98. The "flat-time" system has been criticized because it requires the legislature to engage in the "prodigous" and "impossible" task
of specifying in minute detail the precise circumstances justifying different penalties. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposals for
"Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 560-61 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Alschuler, ProsecutorialPower]. See Schulhofer, Due Processof Sentencing, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 733, 738 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Schulhofer]. The fixed-price system has
also been attacked on the ground that it would merely move unstructured discretion from
the judge to the prosecutor. Alachuler, ProsecutorialPower, supra this note, at 563-76. Finally, critics have suggested that flat-time sentences may, in practice, lead to longer average
terms of imprisonment. Foote, Deceptive Determinate Sentencing, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF LAw ENFORCEMENT & CIMINAL JUSTICE, DETE MNATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRES-

133-41 (1978); Hoffman & Stover, supra note 4, at 100.
A guideline system differs from the flat-time system in that the former retains fairly
broad legislative punishment categories and delegates to an administrative or judicial body
the task of-devising guideline ranges. The individual decision-maker then applies the guidelines to arrive at an appropriate sentence, but may also deviate therefrom, provided justification for the departure is given.
7. Prior to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. § 42014218 (1976), the Commission was known as the Board of Parole. For the purposes of this
article, the term "Parole Commission" will be used throughout.
8. The guidelines are set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). See also infra notes 33-53 and
accompanying text. After this article was completed, the Parole Commission announced a
final rule which revises certain features of the guidelines. 47 Fed. Reg. 56,334 (1982). The
revised guidelines, effective January 31, 1983, are discussed in the epilogue to this article,
and are set forth, in part, in Appendix I. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
While the Commission's change merits comment, it does not affect the analysis in this article in any major respect.
SION
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lease decision upon a computation of the severity of the inmate's
current offense and his prior criminal behavior. Because the facts
necessary to such computation are known by the time of sentencing, offenders can be informed of a presumptive release date
shortly after entering prison. The Commission's guideline system
thus attempts to achieve the goals of equity and determinacy
sought by the advocates of sentencing reform.
Although the guidelines have been in place for almost a decade,
only limited attention has been paid to some of their effects upon
the sentencing system. This article examines the current parole
system and suggests some lessons which sentence reformers may
draw from the first federal guideline experiment. The first section
provides a brief background and description of the Parole Commission's guidelines. The second part discusses the Commission's factfinding procedures. This section explores the difficulty of determining pre-incarceration historical facts in a post-sentencing administrative proceeding. The third section considers the effect of
the guidelines upon federal sentencing options and contends that
imposition of the guidelines has created friction between the Commission and the participants at sentencing. That friction has in
turn produced an effort by attorneys and judges to avoid the
guidelines, and has hindered the Commission's efforts to reduce
disparity. Finally, the article examines the proposals currently
pending in Congress which seek to replace the Parole Commission
with a judicial sentencing guideline system. The article concludes
that, at present, too little is known about the impact of sentence
guidelines to warrant abolition of the Commission.
THE PAROLE GUIDELINES: HISTORY AND OPERATION

The Pre-Guideline System
The parole system developed, in large part, because of changes
enacted during the Progressive Era in one of this country's first
great experiments in sentencing reform. By the latter part of the
nineteenth century, reformers had come to believe that criminal
punishment should fit the offender, not simply the crime. These
advocates maintained that criminal sentences should be structured
to further rehabilitation and that release from imprisonment
should occur when rehabilitation was achieved.9 A necessary corol-

9.

NATIONAL PRISON Assoc., TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PENITEN-

TIARY AND REFORM DISCIPLINE 541-42 (Wines ed. 1870) (reprinted by American Correctional
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lary of this theory was that the optimum period of incarceration
could only be determined during the term of sentence. Since
judges could not predict, when imposing sentence, how soon a prisoner would become rehabilitated,' parole authorities were delegated
the authority to determine the appropriate release period.1 0
Although rehabilitation was never the only goal of criminal sentencing, the rehabilitative model greatly influenced sentencing
structures. Thus, in the federal system, Congress prescribed a
broad range of punishments for most offenses. The sentencing
judge was given complete discretion to sentence an inmate to probation or to prison and, if imprisonment was imposed, wide discretion to select an appropriate maximum sentence. After 1958, the
court also possessed some discretion to set the date when an inmate became eligible for parole.' No guidelines existed for these
determinations, nor was the court required to state its reasons for
imposing a sentence. Finally, after the inmate became parole eligible, the federal Parole Commission would review his progress and
determine when he was ready for release.
For over sixty years federal parole authorities were authorized
under this system to grant parole to eligible inmates if there existed a "reasonable probability" that the inmate could "live and
remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if, in the opinion
of the Board such release [was] not incompatible with the welfare
of society.' 2 Prior to publication of its parole policy guidelines in

Association); Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 27 (1899) ("Convicts can
never be rightfully imprisoned except upon proof that it is unsafe for themselves and for
society to leave them free, and when confined can never be rightfully released until they
show themselves fit for membership in the free community"). See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 2, at 34-40; D. FOGEL, supra note 2, at 30-35; PSSmENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE

SOCIETY 162-63

(1967); Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 31 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Orland].

10.

See

RECTIONS

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COR-

389-90 (1973); Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819 (1910). See also

STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 37-38; Alschuler, ° Sentencing Reform and Parole

Release Guidelines, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 237, 238 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Alschuler,
Parole Release Guidelines]; Hoffman & Stover, supra note 4, at 91; Skrivseth, Abolishing
Parole: Assuring Fairness and Certainty in Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L. RzV. 281, 282-83
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Skrivseth].
11. See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-752, 72 Stat. 845 (1958) (formerly codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 334 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 4208-4209 (amended 1976)). See also notes 125-31 infra
and accompanying text.
12. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645 §§ 4201-4203, 62 Stat. 854 (1948) (formerly codified in
18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970) (amended 1976)). The criteria were essentially unchanged from
1910 until the enactment of the Parole Commission Reorganization Act of 1976. See Act of
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1973,1 the Parole Commission made almost no attempt to delineate its release criteria. It was difficult, therefore, to judge how the
Commission exercised its discretion, although it was generally assumed that the Commission was influenced significantly by
1' 4
whether an inmate had been "rehabilitated.
The Commission apparently considered an inmate's institutional
progress an important factor in gauging rehabilitation. While the
Commission did not ignore the severity of the inmate's offense or
his prior criminal record, it did indicate that these factors were
only two of many items weighed in determining the release date.
According to the Commission, its interest was in the inmate's future, not his past. 1 5 More precise descriptions of the Commission's
reasons for its decision were impossible, since the Commission refused to attribute any particular weight to the criteria governing
parole release. Indeed, it claimed it could make no such specific
assessment. Instead, the likelihood of parole was determined on an
individualized basis. 6
The parole hearing procedures were veiled in secrecy. Interviews
before hearing examiners were brief and without counsel. After
completing an interview, examiners would forward a recommendation to Washington where the Board of Parole would make a completely discretionary determination whether to grant release.' 7 The
decision, when announced, was unaccompanied by explanation."8

June 25, 1910, ch. 387 § 3, 36 Stat. 819 (1910).
13. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973) (codified in 28 C.F.R. § 2.20).
14. See Curtis, FederalJudicial Power, Parole Guidelines, and Sentence Reform, in II
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK, THEORY, LITIGATION, PRACTICE 91, 101-02, 120 n.57 (I. Robbins ed., student ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Curtis]; Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM.
U.L. REv. 477, 492 & n.60 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kastenmeier & Eglit]. As George
Reed, former Chairman of the Board, testified before Congress: "I believe that basic to
every decision of the Parole Board is a philosophy of releasing inmates on parole at the
psychologically 'right time' to best assure their eventual complete rehabilitation." Hearings
on Corrections, Federal and State Parole Systems Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1972) (testimony of George Reed, former
Chairman, United States Board of Parole).
15. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, YOU AND THE PAROLE BOARD 4-5 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as You AND THE PAROLE BOARD], quoted in Curtis, supra note 14, at 120 n.57.
16. As one Parole Commission publication stated: "Since no man's situation is just like
another man's, factors of importance in one case won't even be considered in another." You
AND THE PAROLE BOARD,

supra note 15, at 4, question 11.

17. Project, Parole Release Decision-Making and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J.
810, 820-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Project].
18. Id. at 821.
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Despite its hopeful origins, this system1 9 was eventually assailed
by commentators 0 and the courts 2 for lacking both articulated
standards to regulate Commission discretion and procedural protection for inmates.22 Sentencing experts also began to voice disillusionment with the rehabilitative model of sentencing. Social science studies seemed to demonstrate that prison programs had
little effect in curbing recidivism. 28 Moreover, experts questioned
the ability of parole officers to measure when or whether an inmate
had become rehabilitated.2 4 Opponents of the model stated that
the stress of not knowing one's release date was morally unjustifiable and questioned whether rehabilitation could ever be achieved
if it were coerced under threat of a longer sentence. 2 ' Finally, there
were eloquent expressions of concern over unwarranted disparities
in sentencing which resulted2 from
the unstructured discretion pos'
sessed by sentencing judges.
In partial response to these criticisms, the Parole Commission, in
19. The federal parole system's secret hearing system resembled those of most states.
According to a national survey completed in 1972, 40 states did not give reasons for their
decisions, 31 made no verbatim record of the proceedings, 30 prohibited counsel, and 34
prevented the inmates from calling witnesses. O'Leary & Nuffield, A National Survey of
Parole Decision-Making, 19 CRIME & DELIQUENCY 378, 386 (1973); O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decison-Making Characteristics:Report of a National Survey, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 651,
658 (1972). See also Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 14, at 482 (1973); Project, supra note
17, at 821 n.54. By 1976, most jurisdictions had modified their procedures to provide that a
statement of reasons for parole grant or denial be given the inmate. However, 29 jurisdictions continued to refuse to permit counsel's attendance, 28 states did not make verbatim
records of proceedings, and 31 states did not permit the inmate to call witnesses. V.
O'LEAsY & K. HANIRHAN, PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (3d ed. 1976).
20. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRErIONARY JusricE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 126-33 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as K. DAVIs]; See also Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 14, at 482-99;
ABA, Administrative Conference Recommendation 72-3: Procedures of the United States
Board of Parole, 25 AD. L. REv. 531 (1973).
21. See, e.g., Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973),
modified, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22. Professor Davis's critique of the Commission concluded that "the performance of the
Parole Board seems on the whole about as low in quality as anything I have seen in the
federal government." K. DAVIs, supra note 20, at 133.
23. D. LUToN, R. MARTINSON & J. WLs, THE EFFECT VENESS OF CoRMcONAL TREATMmer (1975); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME &
DELINQUENcY 67 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Robison & Smith]. But see Martinson, New
Findings,New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv.
243 (1979) (questioning his earlier views).
24. See, e.g., P. HoFFMAN, PAROLE SELECTION: A BALARCE OF Two TYPES OF ERROR 6-8
(NCCD Parole Decision Making Supp. Rep. No. 10, 1973); Bixby, A New Role for Parole
Boards, 34 FED. PROBATION 24-28 (June, 1970); Robison & Smith, supra note 23, at 68-80;
Project, supra note 17, at 826 n.82.
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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cooperation with the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
launched a study to determine the criteria implicit in its decisionmaking.27 After completing the study, the Commission introduced
a system of guidelines, first on an experimental basis in the northeast in 1972,28 and then nationwide in 1973. s" In 1976, Congress
passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act,30 which reorganized the Board of Parole into the United States Parole Commission and explicitly authorized the Commission to implement.
guidelines in making its parole decisions. 3 ' While minor changes
have since been made in the guidelines, the system adopted in
1973 is essentially the one which is in use today."2
Operation of the Guidelines System
The Commission's guideline scheme embraces the twin goals of

27. See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Parole Policy Explicit, 21
CRIME & DELIQUENCY 34, 37-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler &
Wilkins], reprintedin FEDERAL PAROLE DECISION MAKING: SELECTED REPRINTS 7, 10-12 (U.S.
Parole Comm'n Research Unit 1978) [hereinafter cited as SELECT REPRINTS vol. I]; See
also P. HOFFMAN & D. GOTTFREDSON, PAROLING POLICY GUIDELINES: A MATTER OF EQurry
(NCCD Parole Decision Making Project Supp. Rep. No. 9, 1973) [hereinafter cited as P.
HOFFMAN & D. GoTTFREDSON].
28. See P. HOFFMAN & D. GoTrFREDSON, supra note 27, at 12-13; Project, supra note 17,
at 822 n.59. See also Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 926 (D. Conn. 1973).
29. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20). The guidelines originated
from a study of decision making in cases under the Youth Corrections Act between 1971 and
1972. See P. HOFFMAN, PAROLING POLICY FEEDBACK 4-8 (NCCD Parole Decision Making Project Supp. Rep. No. 8, 1973). The study concluded that the evaluation by board members of
the inmate's institutional program participation and disciplinary record were relatively insignificant factors in determining the parole decision. Rather, the examiner's rating of severity of the offense was found to be the most significant factor in the determinations, with the
rating of parole prognosis the second most important item. Id. at 16.
After receiving the study, the Commission decided to transform the data into a set of
guidelines for adult and youthful offenders. See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins,
supra note 27, at 38; SELECTED REPRINTS vol. I, supra note 27, at 11; P. HoFFMAN & D.
GOTrFREDSON, supra note 27, at 7-12. See also Flaxman, The Hidden Dangers of Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. RV.259, 269 (1979).
30. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976)).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1976).
32. Various changes have been made in the "offense severity" and "salient factor" score
over the years. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 36,138 (1981) (change in offense severity); 46 Fed. Reg.
35,637 (1981) (revision of salient factor score); 44 Fed. Reg. 26,540-26,542 (1979) (change in
offense severity); 42 Fed. Reg. 52,398 (1977) (subdividing "greatest" severity level into greatest I and greatest II); 42 Fed. Reg. 31,784 (1977) (change in offense severity); 42 Fed. Reg.
12,043 (1977) (change in salient factor score). After this article was completed, the Commission announced another revision of its guidelines. 47 Fed. Reg. 56,334 (1982); see infra notes
205-09 and accompanying text.
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equity and determinacy. 83 The guidelines seek to achieve equity by
structuring discretion so that prisoners with similar backgrounds
and offense characteristics will be released after serving the same
amount of time. 4 The guideline system achieves determinacy by
requiring that the inmate's presumptive release date be fixed
shortly after the sentence begins, and by permitting only minor alterations in the date for reasons of positive institutional conduct.3 5
The guidelines employ two basic measures to determine when an
inmate eligible for parole should be released: "offense severity"
rating and "salient factor" score. First, the Commission ranks the
type of crime committed by the inmate into one of seven "offense
severity" categories, ranging from "low" severity for, as an example, possession with intent to distribute small amounts of marijuana, to "greatest II" severity for crimes such as kidnapping.3 6 In
ranking the inmate's crime on the offense severity scale, the Commission does not look solely to the crime of conviction; rather, it
independently evaluates the case and determines the defendint's

33. P. HOFFMAN & D. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 27, at viii-x, 19-21; Stone-Meierhoefer &
Hoffman, Presumptive Parole Dates: The Federal Approach, 46 FED. PROBATION 41 (June
1982) [hereinafter cited as Stone-Meierhoefer & Hoffman], reprinted in 4 FEDERAL PAROLE
DECISION MAKING: SELECTED REPRINTS 7 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit 1982) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED REPRINTS vol. IV]. See also McCall, The Future of Parole - In
Rebuttal of S. 1437, 42 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as McCall], reprinted in 2 FEDERAL PAROLE DECISION MAKING: SELECTED REPRINTS 41-42 (U.S. Parole
Comm'n Research Unit 1980) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED REPRINTS vol. II].

34. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 26,549 (1979); Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, supra.
note 27, at 41-42; SELECTED REPRINTS vol. I, supra note 27, at 14-15; McCall, supra note 33,
at 3-4; SELECTED REPRINTS vol. II, supra note 33, at 41-42.
35. See Stone-Meierhoefer & Hoffman, supra note 33, at 41-45; SELECTED REPRINTS vol.
IV, supra note 33, at 7-11; 42 Fed. Reg. 39,808 (1977) (Commission explanation for early
hearing system). See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. While inmates who follow
institutional directives can receive only modest advances in a release date for superior be-

havior, the Commission retains the discretion to impose substantial penalties upon inmates
who violate institutional rules. See Stone-Meierhoefer & Hoffman, supra note 33, at 43;
SELECTED REPRINTS vol. IV, supra note 33, at 9. According to the Commission, the guidelines are predicated upon "good institutional adjustment and program progress." 28 C.F.R.

§ 2.20(b) (1981).
36. The current levels are low, low moderate, moderate, high, very high, greatest I, and
greatest II. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). In a final rule effective Jan. 31, 1983, the Commission will modify this scheme by dividing the offense severity rankings into eight categories
and by redesignating the levels in numerical form. See 47 Fed. Reg. 56,336 (1982). See also
infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text. The descriptive terms in effect in 1982 will be
used throughout this article. At the time the guidelines were implemented in 1973, the offenses were divided into six severity levels (low, low moderate, moderate, high, very high
and greatest). See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973). In 1977, the "greatest" severity level was
subdivided into "greatest I" and "greatest I" categories. See 42 Fed. Reg. 52,398 (1977).
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actual "offense behavior. 3' 7 The Commission takes into account

criminal charges dismissed before or after plea bargaining, as well
as allegations of criminal conduct which never even resulted in the
filing of charges.38 Thus, the Commission attempts to treat the individual accused of bank robbery who pleads to larceny the same
as the individual who pleads to bank robbery, if it believes that the
two participated in the same type of crime. Moreover, the Commission's decision to categorize a particular type of offense behavior as
"low" or "high" bears no particular relationship to the maximum
possible sentence decreed by Congress. Offenses with the same
maximum sentence may fall into widely different severity categories. For instance, a mail theft conviction is a "moderate" offense if
the value of the property taken is $2,000-$20,000; a "high" offense
if the value is from $20,000-$100,000; a "very high" offense if the
value is $100,000-$500,000; and a "greatest" offense if the value is
over $500,000.1
The second measure used by the Commission to determine the
release date ranks the inmate's risk of violating parole into one of
four categories based upon the inmate's salient factor score. This
score is obtained by a ten point scale which measures six different
salient factors. 0 Each of the salient factor variables is worth from
37. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981); UNrran STATES PARIOL COMM'N, RULES AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL 122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PROCEDURES MANUAL].
38. See 44 Fed. Reg. 26,549 (1979). The Commission's Procedures Manual states that
the examiners may take into account information contained in a count of an indictment that
was dismissed as a result of plea bargaining, or any allegation which is corroborated by
established factors and from a source which appears credible. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra
note 37, at 122.
39. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981).
40. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). When the guidelines were first imposed, the salient factors
were: number of prior convictions, number of prior incarcerations, age at first commitment,
whether the commitment involved auto theft, whether parole was revoked, the inmate's history of drug dependence, the presence or absence of high school education, the existence of
verified employment prior to incarceration, and the existence of a place to live with spouse
and children. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1973). The number of possible points attainable for each
salient factor varied between one and three, with a total of 11 points possible for all the
items. The present salient factor guidelines no longer consider the inmate's education, previous employment, or release plan. The current factors are: the number of prior convictions
and adjudications, the number of prior commitments of more than 30 days, the age at commencement of the current offense or prior commitment, whether the inmate has a recent
"commitment free period," the inmate's probation/parole/confinement/escape status, and
his history of heroin or opiate dependence. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981).
These particular factors are thought to reflect the ability of the parolee to avoid parole
violations or subsequent arrests or convictions. The original factors were chosen following
research on the history and characteristics of a sample of inmates released from prison in
1970. Hoffman & Beck, Parole Decision Making: A Salient Factor Score, 2 J. CiuM. JUST.
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one to three points. These points are added together to arrive at
one of four salient factor categories;4" the higher the salient factor
category, the shorter the period of incarceration the inmate can
expect. 42 The variables, such as the number of prior convictions,
measure the inmate's prior criminal history; they are not intended
or able to measure rehabilitative progress during the prisoner's
term.
The two release date measures form the axes of a graph plotted
by the Commission. At the intersection of each offense severity
and salient factor category, a range of months is established. By
computing the inmate's offense severity and salient factor score,
the hearing examiners can arrive at a specific range of months of
incarceration for the inmate."'
Thus, a hypothetical inmate charged and convicted of armed
bank robbery should receive an offense severity rating of "very
high," as long as he neither fired a weapon nor injured a victim in
the robbery. If the inmate has an unblemished prior record and
195 (1974), reprinted in SmzcrD RzPEINTs vol. I, supra note 27, at 47 (1978).
Several subsequent analyses have been performed to demonstrate the correlation between
success on release and a high salient factor score. See Hoffman & Beck, Salient Factor
Score Validation - A 1972 Release Cohort, 4 J. Cram. JUST. 69 (1976), reprinted in SELECTED REPRINTS vol. I, supra note 27, at 59 (1978); Hoffman, Stone-Meierhoefer & Beck,
Salient Factor Score and Release Behavior: Three Validation Samples, 2 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 47 (1978), reprintedin SEZLECTn REPRINTS vol. II, supra note 33, at 63; Hoffman &
Beck, Revalidating the Salient Factor Score: A Research Note, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 185 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Hoffman & Beck], reprinted in 3 FEDERAL PAROLE DECISION MAKING:
SELECTED REPRINTS 51 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit 1981) [hereinafter cited as SELEcTrD REPRINTS vol. III].
The most recent survey, a sample of 697 inmates released in 1976, found that the following percentage of each salient factor category had achieved a "favorable outcome" - that is,
had not been rearrested within one year from release.
SALIENT FACTOR SCORE
[0.31

[4-5]

(6-8]

[9-11]

56%

63%

73%

92%

Figures from the 1970 and 1971 samples are:

1970
1971

[0-3]

14-5]

[6-8]

[9-11]

51%
51%

64%
60%

76%
78%

91%
91%

See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 40; SmzcrE REPRINrs vol. III, supra note 40, at 52.
41. The salient factor score categories are: "very good," "good," "fair" and "poor." 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981).
42. See supra note 40.
43. The present parole guidelines, found at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981), are set forth at Appendix II to this article. The guideline table, which will become effective on Jan. 31, 1983, is
found at 47 Fed. Reg. 56,336 (1982) and is in part set forth as Appendix I.
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accordingly a "very good" salient factor score, he should expect a
parole date in twenty-four to thirty-six months. An inmate with
one prior conviction for which he had been imprisoned for over
thirty days within three years of the robbery would receive only a

"good" salient factor score and should anticipate a term of thirtysix to forty-eight Months.
In the majority of cases, eligible federal prisoners are paroled
within the guideline ranges. Those inmates who, because of the
length of their sentence, do not become eligible for parole4 until
serving a minimum period of time that exceeds the expected guideline period can expect parole as soon as they become parole eligible; inmates whose sentences expire short of the indicated guideline range are generally required to serve the sentences until
expiration.45 In fewer than twenty percent of the cases, the examiners will render a discretionary decision above or below the guidelines. 46 Such decisions must be accompanied by specific explanations of "good cause" for the deviation.47
Commission rules provide that most prisoners receive an initial
parole hearing and guideline determination within 120 days of the
beginning of the federal sentence.4 8 Interim hearings are then
scheduled at specified intervals to consider any changes which may

44. An inmate with a sentence of over one year will generally be eligible for parole after
serving one-third of his sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976). The sentencing court possesses
the discretion to designate the inmate eligible for parole at any time prior to the one-third
point, or to declare the inmate immediately eligible for parole. Id. at § 4205(b).
45. In approximately 11% of its decisions between October 1979 and September 1980,
the Commission released inmates already over the guidelines at the time they became parole
eligible; in 16% of the cases, the Commission "continued to expiration" inmates whose
sentences expired prior to their guideline range. Thus, in only 73% of the cases within its
jurisdiction does the Commission have the option of applying its guidelines. See figures furnished by United States Parole Commission (on file with the Kansas Defender Project).
46. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JusTICE, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION [1978-1980] 22 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PAROLE COMMISSION REPORT]. In the period between October 1978 and September 1980, the following percentage of decisions were
either rendered within the guidelines or were "non-discretionary" decisions outside the
guidelines:
79.3%
1978
80.7%
1979
82.6%
1980
47. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(d) (1981).
48. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (1981). "By making a presumptive release decision early in the parole process, the prisoner is given certainty to the extent that a release date has been set
which cannot be taken away except for specified reasons." Stone-Meierhoefer & Hoffman,
supra note 33, at 43; SEI cTED RPmRNrs vol. IV, supra note 33, at 8. The early hearing
provision is inapplicable to those prisoners who do not become parole eligible within 10
years, i.e., prisoners with sentences of over 30 years. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1981).
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have occurred after the initial hearing. 49 Following an interim
hearing, the Commission may order no change in the parole date,
advance the parole date, or retard the date if the inmate has committed disciplinary infractions. 0 The Commission's regulations
specify that a presumptive parole date should not be advanced on
the basis of an inmate's good institutional behavior unless the inmate can demonstrate superior program achievement or other
clearly exceptional circumstances. 51 The Commission publishes a
scale which specifies the permissible reduction in a presumptive
parole date for superior achievement. For example, an inmate with
a guideline range of forty-three to forty-eight months incarceration
can have a reduction
for superior program achievement of no more
52
than five months.

In sum, the Commission sets a
all prisoners at the outset of the
approximates the inmate's actual
violates institutional rules, there
change in the release date.

tentative parole date for almost
inmate's sentence which closely
release date. Unless the inmate
is little he can do to affect a

Parole Commission Fact-Finding
Given the history of parole, it is difficult to overemphasize the
change caused by the Parole Commission guidelines. With a single
stroke, the Commission publicly abandoned the task previously
thought to be its principal justification for existence: the predictive
evaluation of rehabilitation. In its place, the Commission created a
highly structured system for judging retribution (offense behavior)
and incapacitation (salient factor) upon pre-incarceration data.
The Commission's determination to base its parole decisions upon
specific findings of historical fact, rather than evanescent judgments concerning rehabilitation, was designed to promote a more
consistent exercise of discretion and equality of treatment for like
cases. However, equitable decision-making can only be achieved if
Commission hearings are adequate to determine the facts.
In reaching its decisions, the Commission looks beyond the factual findings made at the criminal trial or admitted by a guilty
49. 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(a) (1981).
50. Id. § 2.14(a)(2), (3).
51. Id. § 2.60.
52. Id. § 2.60(e).
53. Application of the guidelines and release on parole is predicated on good institutional behavior. 28 C.F.R. § 2.18 (1981). Inmates who violate institutional rules are also
subject to rescission of presumptive parole dates. Id. § 2.34.
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plea. The Commission's decision to consider total offense behavior
in determining offense severity often requires hearing examiners to
decide whether an inmate engaged in criminal conduct evinced by
charges dismissed under a plea bargain, or by allegations which
never resulted in a criminal charge. Similarly, to determine the salient factor score, examiners must judge facts, such as the number
of prior incarcerations over thirty days, which would rarely be the
subject of an admission at plea or proof at trial.
Although the quality of its decision-making depends heavily
upon accurate fact-finding, the Commission has neither the time
nor the resources to determine pre-incarceration data in a de novo
evidentiary hearing. The Commission's hearing examiners are responsible for over 10,000 initial hearings each year;" each hearing
examiner averages twelve hearings per working day.55 Moreover,
the timing and location of the hearings preclude full-blown adversary proceedings. Parole hearings are held at federal penal institutions, which are often far from the place of trial. The cost and inconvenience of transporting witnesses to evidentiary hearings at
these institutions would be staggering. Furthermore, if evidentiary
hearings were held, the Commission would be pressed to assign
counsel and permit cross-examination." Parole hearings would

54. P AOLE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 19. The examiners held 11,980 initial
hearings in 1978, 11,872 hearings in 1979, and 10,379 hearings in 1980. Id.
55. Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Parole Commission: Oversight Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1981) (testimony of Cecil C. McCall).
56. See generally Alchuler, Parole Release Guidelines, supra note 10, at 239-40.
Whether any of these procedural incidents ought to be required as a matter of due process
is a question beyond the scope of this article. The critical case is Greenholtz v. Inmates,
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), in which the Court examined
whether Nebraska parole release procedures comported with due process. The initial parole
hearing in Nebraska involved an annual file review of the inmate's status, followed by an
interview with the prisoner. The Eighth Circuit had held the procedure inadequate, and
required, inter alia, that a "formal hearing" be held for each eligible inmate. The Supreme
Court reversed. The Court first declared that a denial of parole release does not constitute a
deprivation of "liberty" calling for due process protection absent a state created "entitlement." After accepting that the Nebraska statute created such an entitlement, the Court
determined that Nebraska's file review plus interview procedure adequately safeguarded
against serious risks of error, and thus satisfied due process. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15.
At first blush, Greenholtz provides strong support for the view that the current Commission procedures are more than adequate to satisfy due process. The federal parole hearing
system provides considerably more procedural protections than the Nebraska process held
adequate in Greenholtz. Moreover, the courts are not even agreed that the federal parole
statutes create a protectible entitlement sufficient to call due process analysis into play.
Compare Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1981) and Evans v. Dillahunty,
662 F.2d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1981), with Page v. United States Parole Comm'n, 651 F.2d
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thus be transformed from today's brief proceeding into extensive
and expensive hearings.
Because it is unequipped to hold evidentiary hearings, the Commission has designed a proceeding which relies heavily upon data
prepared for the judicial sentencing hearing. The Commission is
directed by statute to consider a variety of record evidence, including psychiatric evaluations, recommendations made by the sentencing judge, official reports of the inmate's criminal record and
the presentence report. 57 Before the hearing, the prisoner is permitted to review these records and may present additional documentary evidence. 8 At the hearing, the examiners will ordinarily
discuss with the inmate the various offense severity and salient
factor items and any other information they deem pertinent.59 The
hearing, however, is not a trial; there is no witness testimony or
cross-examination. While the prisoner may be represented by a
person of his choice, the representative's function is limited to
making a statement at the close of the hearing or responding to the
examiner's questions.60 The initial hearing is thus an opportunity
to present documentary evidence and clarify the existing record,
rather than a forum for a de novo evidentiary hearing.
While the Commission may consider a variety of data, the
presentence investigation report (PIR) prepared by the probation
office for the sentencing judge is generally the key document for
guideline assessment. 6' Prepared after the trial or plea and follow1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1981) and Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666, 670 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1979).
Nevertheless, there are notable differences between the federal and Nebraska statutes
which support claims for greater procedural protections in federal parole release decisions.
The Supreme Court in Greenholtz took pains to distinguish the Nebraska Parole Board's
decisions, which were described as "subjective in part and predictive in part," from procedures "designed to elicit specific facts." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13, 14. The federal parole
system no longer purports to make subjective, "equity" type judgments, but bases its decision on specific factual findings. Arguably, its hearing system requires a greater measure of
procedural protections. See Alschuler, Parole Release Guidelines, supra note 10, at 240 &
n.12.
57. 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(a) (1981).
58. Id. §§ 2.11(e) & 2.19(b). All record evidence is disclosable except "(1) [djiagnostic
opinions, which if known to the prisoner could lead to a serious disruption of his institutional program; (2) [m]aterial which would reveal a source of information obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality; or (3) [a]ny other information, which if disclosed, might result in
harm, physical or otherwise to any person." Id. § 2.55(c). The information withheld must be
summarized for the inmate. Id. § 2.55(d).
59. Id. § 2.13(a).
60. Id. 2.13(b).
61. P. HoniAN, B. STONa-M mRHOzRR & J. FIFE, RELiABIrry IN GumEmLNf APPLiCATON: INITIAL HEAMNGS 1980 8 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 27, Draft
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ing interviews with the defendant and law enforcement personnel,
the report includes a summary of the defendant's background and
prior record as well as prosecution and defense descriptions of the
offense." The PIR description of the offender's background and
criminal record frequently serves as the source of the information
for the salient factor score.as Moreover, the prosecutor's version of
the offense, the official version contained in the PIR, is the crucial
tool for rating offense severity."
Even though they are the key documents in deciding parole
guidelines, presentence reports are nonetheless prepared in a manner which invites the inclusion of unclear, inaccurate, and unverified information. In compiling the reports, probation officers are
not restricted to firsthand or carefully documented information.
Many probation officers investigate and report all relevant information concerning the defendant, whether or not it is demonstrably reliable. 65 Accordingly, officers will often include unverified inJuly, 1981) [hereinafter cited as P.

HOFFMAN, INITIAL HEARINGS].

See, e.g., Curtis, supra

note 14, at 108; Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1615,
1628-30 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fennell & Hall]; Project, supra note 17, at 878.
62. See DIVISION OF PROBATION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT (Pub. No. 105, 1978) [hereinafter cited as PRESENTENCE INVESrIGA-

TION REPORT].
The Administrative Office Publication directs that the Presentence Investigation Report
(PIR) be divided into five "core" categories. First, the report is to relate the "official" (prosecutor's) and the "defendant's" version of the offense. This section should include a description of the defendant's specific involvement in the offense, as well as any aggravating or
extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense. The second section of the report describes the defendant's "prior record," both juvenile and adult. The Administrative Office
directs that information be given on the date, charge, location, disposition, and representation of counsel for all prior offenses. The third category, "personal and family data," should
include background information on the defendant's relatives, marital status, education, employment, physical, mental and emotional health, military service, and financial wherewithal. The fourth section contains the officer's "evaluation" of the information. The officer
is directed, as part of this section, to estimate the defendant's parole guideline range. The
final section of the report is the officer's "recommendation" for disposition. See id. at 7-17.
63. See Project, supra note 17, at 878. For an example of a case where arguably improper PIR information was used in computing the salient factor score, see Majchszak v.
Ralston, 454 F. Supp. 1137, 1139-41 (W.D. Wis. 1978). See generally P. HOFFMAN, INITIAL
HEARINGS, supra note 61.
64. See Project, supra note 17, at 878-79. For cases in which the defendant has challenged offense behavior information based upon the PIR, see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Goldberg v. Warden, 622 F.2d 60 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); Billiteri v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Petri v.
Warden, 507 F. Supp. 5 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Payton v. Thomas, 486 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
65. See Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("to 'screen out'
material information would be an abuse of the probation officer's discretion and an arroga-
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formation in the report, with at most an attribution of the source
of the information."
The probation officer's treatment of the official version of the
offense presents particularly significant opportunities for the inclusion of unreliable information. This portion of the report is prepared from United States Attorney files and from interviews with
law enforcement personnel. 6 7 In the course of this investigation,
the probation officer may read reports which state in conclusory
fashion that the defendant is an organized crime figure or ringleader,as or which charge the defendant with criminality on a grand
scale. 9 If and when the source of the information is identified, the
information may prove to be double or triple hearsay. Nevertheless, this data will often be presented as fact in the official report.70
While the allegations in the official report may be challenged by
the inmate at his parole hearing, they are not easily disproved.
Commission regulations provide that when PIR allegations are
tion of the court's own authority to determine the importance of information in the imposition of sentence"). Fennell & Hall, supra note 61, at 1658. See also PRESENMNCE INVE SATION REPORT, supra note 62, at 9.
66. See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. Rzv. 1362, 1395 (1975); Fennell & Hall, supra note 61,
at 1657-58. See also infra note 70.
67. PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 62, at 8-9.
68. Id. at 9; see Fennell & Hall, supra note 61, at 1656-57. See also infra notes 69-70.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (information depicting defendant as major drug supplier).
70. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1978) (allegation that
defendant was member of "Black Mafia" and had shot several people); United States v.
Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1975) (organized crime allegation); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (drug supplier
allegation).
A criminal defense attorney related the following experience from personal knowledge:
A presentence report prepared on a defendant convicted of a bank robbery stated
that the defendant was involved in six other robberies. No other information was
given - neither the basis of the assertion nor the source of the information; not
even the dates and the places of the alleged robberies. The same report stated
that the defendant himself was in possession of a weapon during the robbery. Not
only was no basis for the assertion stated, it was contrary to the evidence at trial.
Statement of Phylis Skloot Bamberger, on behalf of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, concerning Proposed Federal Criminal Code H.R. 1647, prepared for the Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1981) (copy available at
the Kansas Defender Project) [hereinafter cited as Bamberger].
The persistence of this unreliable information can be attributed to the failure of probation officers to verify the information related by law enforcement officers. Fennell & Hall,
supra note 60, at 1657. Another reason advanced by commentators for misleading PIR information is the anti-defendant bias of some probation officers. See Bamberger, supra note
70; Frankel, supra note 2, at 34-35.
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challenged, the Commission is to decide the contest by a preponderance of the evidence standard"-that is, the Commission must
weigh the inmate's claim against the PIR information and accept
the version of the facts "that best accords with reason and
probability. 7 2 The difficulty for inmates in meeting this standard
is that most lack the ability to produce evidence to rebut the PIR
information. Inmates usually appear without counsel.7 3 There is no
possibility of calling witnesses from the community where the offense occurred. Inmates may not know where to obtain documentary evidence and, even if they do, the evidence may be unavailable. Thus, inmates are often left to counter an unverified allegation
in the PIR with an unverified denial. In such a contest, the government's version usually prevails. 4
A recent Kansas Defender Project case illustrates the problem.
An inmate received a "greatest I" severity rating based on a finding that his fraud offense resulted in losses of over one million dollars. The inmate claimed the figure was grossly inflated, that no
such loss occurred, and that the figure was never established at
trial. Prior to his hearing, the inmate attempted, but failed, to obtain the trial transcript to document his claim. Instead, he was
obliged to rely upon newspaper accounts of the fraud. Despite an
extensive record of trial, the contest before the Parole Commission
pitted the inmate's unverified denial against the absent prosecutor's estimate of the fraud contained in the PIR. The Commission
chose to rely upon the prosecutor's estimate.
In the above example, the inmate was given a "greatest" severity
rating based on information he alleged was unverified and untrue.
Inmates are also exposed to potentially incorrect decisions by the
Commission because of information which is incomplete or vague.
Recent studies by the General Accounting Office7 6 (GAO) and the
Parole Commission itself" have found that, in many cases, the in-

71. 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(c) (1981); PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 37, at 122.
72. "The normal indicants of reliability are (a) the report is specific as to the behavior
alleged to have taken place; (b) the allegation is corroborated by established facts; and (c)
the source of the allegation appears credible." PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 37, at 122.
73. See PAROLE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 24. In 1980, 35.6% of inmates
appearing for initial hearings were accompanied by "representatives." Id.
74. Project, supra note 17, at 879. The author's observations are in accord with those of
the Yale Project.
75. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES:
BETrER MANAGEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ARE NEEDED (1982) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES].

76. P.

HOFFMAN, INITIAL HEARINGS,

supra note 61, at 6-8.
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formation necessary for guideline assessment is not contained in
the PIR. The Parole Commission study showed that information
concerning the number of prior convictions or parole violations was
often unclear.7 The GAO findings were that forty-two percent of
the presentence reports examined did not include sufficient details
on the nature of the offense or characteristics of the offender to
establish an appropriate offense severity or salient factor score
rating. s
The weakness of the PIR, as a parole hearing device, may be due
in part to the lack of "responsiveness of that document to the informational needs of the Commission. 79 The PIR is a document
intended first and foremost for the sentencing judge. Although the
probation officer is instructed in preparing this report to estimate
the inmate's likely parole guideline range, many officers are unfamiliar with guideline scoring criteria.8 0 Because the facts necessary
to the Commission's ratings may differ from the facts necessary at
sentencing, information critical to the Commission's decisions may
be omitted or overlooked by probation officers. For example, the
guidelines provide that auto theft of less than seventy-two hours
duration with no substantial damage to the car and "not theft for
resale" is a "low" severity crime; a theft of three cars or less with a
value not exceeding $19,999 is classified as "moderate" severity;
and a theft of autos worth $20,000 would rate a "high" classification. The Dyer Act,8 ' which makes it a federal crime to transport a
stolen automobile across state lines, contains no requirement that
the theft occur for any particular duration, or that the autos possess any particular dollar value. Unless the probation officer is cognizant of Commission guidelines, the Commission may find itself
rating offense severity without any statement on the duration of
the theft and with only the barest conclusion on the value of the

77. "Several cases were noted in which it was not clear from the presentence report how
many prior convictions the offender had, or whether or not the offender had been on probation/parole at the time of the current offense." Id. at 7.
78. FEDERAL PAROLE PRATcEs, supra note 75, at 92. The GAO based this finding on

examinations of presentence reports from 10 judicial districts for 342 offenders sentenced to
a term of imprisonment in excess of one year. Id.
79. P. HOFFMAN, INAI
HEARINGS, supra note 61, at 8.
80. See generally P. HOFFMAN, INrrAL HEARINGS, supra note 61, at 6-8; FEDERAL PAROLE
PRAcTicEs, supra note 75, at 94-95.
81. The Dyer Act provides as follows: "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned nor more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
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automobiles.8 2
The defendant can best avoid the consequences of Commission
reliance on the PIR by challenging or clarifying erroneous information in the PIR at the time of sentencing. Before the court may
consider challenged information in sentencing, it must make a
finding on the validity of the evidence. 58 While the nature of the
fact hearing and the burden of proof are open to some doubt," the
defendant, represented by counsel, will at least have the opportunity to present evidence before the court rules on the facts.88 The
court's finding will apparently be accepted by the Commission."
If the court believes it can impose sentence without considering
the challenged information, it may avoid deciding the facts by stating on the record that it is not relying on the contested portion of
the PIR.87 In such a case, the Parole Commission will again be
obliged to make the factfinding determination."8 Recognizing the
practical difficulties facing an inmate who challenges the PIR at
the initial parole hearing, one court recently permitted the defense
counsel to submit- at sentencing proof of a contested matter, de82. 'See generally Alschuler, Parole Release Guidelines, supra note 10, at 239.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972). See also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES & PROCEDURES § 18.64 commentary
at 452-62 (Approved Draft 1979) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES].
84. See SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 83, § 18.64 commentary at 452-62; Note,
A Hidden Issue of Sentencing: Burdens of Proof for Disputed Allegations in Presentence
Reports, 66 GEo. L.J. 1515, 1523-28 and cases cited therein (1978).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 329
(4th Cir. 1973).
86. While employees of the Parole Commission have expressed this view to the author, it
does not appear in written form in the guidelines. See also H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 521 (1980):
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and on the basis of fairness, the United
States Parole Commission is of course bound by findings of fact made by the sentencing court ....
But the Parole Commission may consider newly discovered evidence that was unavailable dispite [sic] diligent and good faith efforts, at the time
of the sentencing hearing.
87. See, e.g., Wixom v. United States, 585 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 1978); Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp. 1148, 1160
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518, 522-23 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp.
1148, 1160 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf. Wixom v. United States, 585 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir.
1978). In Wixom, the Eighth Circuit suggested that where the defense challenged a PIR
allegation and the court failed to credit the information, it would be "inappropriate" for the
Parole Commission to consider the information.
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spite the judge's disclaimer of reliance upon the information. 9 The
court noted that the sentencing hearing was the best opportunity
for the inmate to present evidence on issues which would be decided at the parole proceeding.9 0 Where no evidentiary hearing is
held, defense counsel may still provide an invaluable aid for his
client by submitting a sentencing memorandum to the court which
can then be transmitted to the Parole Commission. This procedure, seldom used by defense attorneys, 91 can provide the inmate
with valuable evidence to be submitted to the examiners.
Whenever a challenge to the PIR takes place, it is essential that
the information disclosed at sentencing be transmitted to the Commission. At present, however, there is no assurance such disclosure
will occur. The Commission has no general procedure requiring
that a copy of the sentencing transcript be included in the parole
file; in most cases, the Commission does not have a copy of the
sentencing minutes when it decides the guideline range.92 Judges
are not required to inform the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole
Commission that certain portions of the PIR were challenged and
not relied on in sentencing.9 3 In fact, recent studies demonstrate
that few judges pass sentencing information on to the Parole Commission.9" In addition, the prisoner is usually many miles from the
court in which he was sentenced and not in contact with his attorney. He may not remember what arguments were made at the time
of sentencing, and may be unable to produce a transcript of the
sentencing hearing.

United States v. Cesaitis, 506 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
Id. at 525.
Of 117 judges questioned, 98 (84%) stated that sentencing memoranda or parallel presentence reports are submitted by private attorneys in no more than 10% of
their cases. Of the judges responding to this question with respect to public attorneys, 75 (89%) stated that such reports were received 10% or less of the time.
Fennell & Hall, supra note 61, at 1669 n.225.
92. FEDERAL PAROLE PRAcTIcEs, supra note 75, at 118-19. In January 1981, the Chief
Judge for the Northern District of California began sending a copy of the sentencing hearing
transcript to the commissioners in all cases where the defendant was sentenced to two or
more years. The Regional Commissioner of the Western Region reported that the information supplied by the court improved the quality of parole decisions. Id. at 119.
93. Id. at 107-09. Fennell & Hall, supra note 61, at 1679-83. Proposed amendments to
rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would require the sentencing judge to
inform the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission of any factual findings made by
the sentencing court on controverted issues, and of any information upon which the court
disclaimed reliance. Judicial Conference of the United States, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Preliminary Draft, reprinted in 30 CRIM. L. Rm. 3001, 3014-15 (1981).
94. Fennell & Hall, supra note 61, at 1682.
89.
90.
91.

1982]

Federal Parole and Sentencing

Thus, as matters presently stand, a significant number of guideline decisions are likely based upon vague, unreliable, or inaccurate
information.'" Such decisions subvert the Commission's goal of
achieving equity. The Commission itself has conceded that its decisions can be no more accurate than the information transmitted to
it." If improvement in Commission factfinding is going to occur,
therefore, it must be accomplished by the sentencing participants.
Probation officers, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys must
recognize their power and responsibility to insure the accuracy of
the information furnished the Commission.
PAROLE GUIDELINES AND THE COURT'S SENTENCING OPTIONS:
GUIDELINE EFFECTS AND MANIPULATIONS

The Parole Commission's policy decisions have altered the administration of federal sentences. The guidelines, in effect, have
turned formerly indeterminate terms into determinate sentences,

but without an overall change in federal sentencing statutes.
Sentences based upon the rehabilitative ideal are administered
under guidelines which predicate release on retribution and incapacitation. Further, the Commission's view of just punishment, has
often' conflicted with that of federal judges, resulting in a belief
among some judges that the Commission's "resentencing" is intruding into the judiciary's domain. 97 It has also conflicted, at

95. Though this research revealed a number of ambiguities in guideline scoring instructions and instances of what appears to be hearing panel error, the variation
in specificity and quality of the information provided to the Commission appears
to be an even more basic problem. Obviously, decisions about sentencing and parole are not likely to be better than the information upon which they are based.
P. HOFFMAN, INITIAL HEARINGS, supra note 61, at 7.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 261 (3d Cir. 1978)
("When . . . the parole authority focuses consideration entirely on factors of deterrence,
incapacitation and retribution, it takes into account... factors that are available to the
sentencing judge. The commission then begins to perform functions which are within the
traditional province of the judiciary."), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he district judges no longer
truly sentence a defendant. The parole guidelines do. This is unfortunate for a number of
reasons.").
An early result of the tension between the district courts and the Parole Commission was
an effort by district courts to overturn guideline decisions when they differed from the expectation of the sentencing judge. See, e.g., Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 136 (3d Cir.
1978); Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975). Eventually, a split in the
circuits arose over the power of the sentencing judge to overturn an otherwise legal sentence
because the Parole Commission's action had rendered inaccurate the judge's understanding
of what would happen to the defendant. United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372 (1st Cir.
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times, with the desires of prosecutors and defense attorneys engaged in plea bargaining. Accordingly, sentencing participants have
tried to anticipate the impact of the guidelines and to avoid their
effects. This section of the article will describe the process of Parole Commission action and judicial reaction.
Commission Action: Rehabilitative Sentences
Youth Corrections Act
The Parole Commission's application of its guidelines to individuals sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA)9'
and the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) 99 has altered
significantly the nature of those sentences. At present, any offender under twenty-six years of age at the time of conviction may
be sentenced under the YCA. If the offender is under twenty-two
years of age, the trial court must sentence under the Act unless it
specifically finds that the inmate is likely to receive "no benefit"
from YCA treatment.100 Offenders between twenty-two and
twenty-six, "young adult offenders," can receive YCA treatment if
the court finds that the offender would benefit from the Act.101 In
either case, once the Act is invoked, the court has three sentencing
options. First, if the court determines that a sentence of incarcera1976); United States v. Salerno, 538 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Slutsky, 514
F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1975). In United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979), the Supreme
Court resolved the conflict, holding that the sentencing court could not entertain collateral
attacks based on arguments that decisions of the Commission frustrated the expectation of
the sentencing judge.
The Court's decision was based upon its interpretation of the federal motion to vacate
sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). The Court noted that previous decisions had held relief
under § 2255 limited to constitutional and jurisdictional errors, or errors constituting a
"fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 185 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). Errors of
fact could be raised only if of the most "fundamental character." Addonizio, 442 U.S. at
186. The Court found that the sentencing judge's error concerning the Parole Commission's
treatment of an inmate was not of "fundamental" character, and further declared that the
sentencing judge had "no enforceable expectation with respect to the actual release of a
defendant short of his statutory term." Id. at 190.
Addonizio established that federal district courts cannot use collateral attack under
§ 2255 as a means of monitoring or determining the release dates of inmates under Parole
Commission jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as this article demonstrates, district judges continue
to possess considerable power by means other than collateral attack to affect the actual
release date of prisoners they sentence. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
98. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
99. Id. §§ 4251-4255.
100. Id. § 5010(d). See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 436-44 (1974).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 4216 (1976).
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tion is unnecessary, it may suspend sentence and place the defendant on probation.10 2 Second, the court may sentence the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for an indeterminate
term of "treatment and supervision"'10 totalling six years. The
court has no discretion to impose a shorter period of confinement;0 4 the statute requires a six-year term, even if the maximum
term which" could be imposed upon an adult is less than six
years. 10 5 Third, where the offense of conviction allows a term
greater than six years, the court may impose an indeterminate sentence of from six years to the maximum term provided.10 e
Enacted in 1950, the YCA was intended to provide "a new alternative sentencing and treatment" scheme for eligible offenders. 0 7
Modelled on the English Borstal system, "the underlying theory of

102. Id. § 5010(a).
103. Id. § 5010(b). An offender committed under § 5010(b) shall be released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four years from the date of conviction,
and discharged unconditionally on or before six years from the date of conviction. Id.
§ 5017(c).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (mandamus issued
against judge imposing a YCA sentence of less than six years); United States v. Cruz, 544
F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (provides that a
federal magistrate may not sentence a youth offender convicted of a misdemeanor to a term
in excess of one year, and may not sentence a youth convicted of a petty offense to more
than six months' confinement).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1982);
Johnson v. United States, 374 F.2d 966, 967 (4th Cir. 1967); Kotz v. United States, 353 F.2d
312, 314 (8th Cir. 1965); Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56, 57 (10th Cir. 1963); Carter v.
United States, 306 F.2d. 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Cunningham v. United States 256 F.2d
467, 472 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Ralston v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233, 238 n.3 & 250 n.13
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1357 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981).
But see United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75-76 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Amidon,
627 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1980).
Hunt and Amidon conclude that changes enacted by the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979
evince Congress' intent to bar the courts from imposing a longer sentence on youths than
could be imposed upon adults. The recent amendment provides that a magistrate may not
sentence an eligible youth convicted of a misdemeanor to a YCA term which extends beyond
one year, and may not sentence a petty offender to a YCA term in excess of six months. 18
U.S.C. § 3401(g)(1) (Supp. III 1979). In Hunt and Amidon, the courts found that Congress
would not have intended to restrict a magistrate's power to impose a YCA indeterminate
term on a misdemeanant while permitting such a sentence to be imposed by a district judge.
Thus, the courts found it "implicit in the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 that Congress
intended that neither a district court judge nor a magistrate may sentence a youth under
the Youth Corrections Act to a term of confinement longer than it could impose on an
adult." Amidon, 627 F.2d at 1027, quoted in United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 76 n.8 (6th
Cir. 1981). Contra United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982) (explicitly rejecting Amidon).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
107. S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949).
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the bill [was] to substitute for retributive punishment methods of
training and treatment designed to correct and prevent anti-social
tendencies. It departs from the mere punitive ideas of dealing with
criminals and looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilitation."108 This rehabilitation was to be accomplished by correctional, educational, vocational, and psychological treatment in facilities designed to keep youths segregated from more hardened
criminals.109 In keeping with the goals of the statute, an individual
was considered entitled to release when he became rehabilitated. ' 0
Despite the rehabilitative character of the YCA, the Parole Commission, in 1973, designed its own set of guidelines for youthful
offenders. ' These guidelines, generally in effect today,1 2 apply
the same offense severity and salient factor score criteria to all persons under twenty-two years of age, whether they are sentenced to
108. H.R. Rzp. No. 2979, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
109. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 434 (1974).
110. See, e.g., Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 546 & n.7 (1978) (quoting Correctional System for Young Offenders: Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949) (statement of James V.
Bennet, Director, Bureau of Prisons)); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 434-35
(1974); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1977).
111. The Youth/NARA guidelines are now set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). The
Commission's imposition of the parole guidelines upon what was thought to be a rehabilitative sentencing scheme produced a flurry of litigation. A number of courts concluded that
the Commission's unilateral decision to give great weight to offense severity contravened
congressional intent as expressed in the release provisions of the YCA. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Garrison, 659 F.2d 440, 443-44 (4th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Mayet v. Sigler, 403 F.
Supp. 1243 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 556 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1977).
In 1976, Congress amended the YCA to make YCA release decisions subject to the general
parole criteria applicable to adults. See Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-233, § 7, 90 Stat. 219, 232 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5017(a) (1976)). Relying on
this change, courts have generally approved the application of the guidelines to prisoners
whose offenses occurred after 1976. See Smith v. Hambrick, 637 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1980);
Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372
(1st Cir. 1976). But see Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981). On the other
hand, the majority of courts have held it a violation of the ex post facto clause to apply the
post-1976 standards to prisoners tried before 1976. E.g., Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440,
444-45 (4th Cir. 1981); Benites v. United States Parole Comm'n, 595 F.2d 518, 521 (9th Cir.
1979); DePeralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d
654 (2d Cir. 1977).
112. But cf. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981). In Watts, the Tenth Circuit determined that the "uniform" application of the Parole Commission Youth Guidelines,
even to prisoners sentenced after 1976, violated congressional intent as expressed in the
Youth Corrections Act. Id. at 1377. The court found that the use of the guidelines was not
per se illegal, but held that the YCA requires that the inmate's "rehabilitation" and "response to treatment" be considered. Id. at 1382. The court also found the Commission's
rigid application of the guidelines to violate that mandate. At present, the status of the YCA
guidelines in the Tenth Circuit is at best uncertain.
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YCA or regular adult sentences. For parole purposes, all youths are
treated similarly.11 3 The only difference between the youth and
adult guidelines is that the youth guidelines provide for a shorter
term of incarceration in each guideline range.
The imposition of Parole Commission guidelines would seem to
place YCA inmates in the same position as youths sentenced under
regular sentences. In fact, YCA inmates may often serve longer
terms than non-YCA inmates. While the non-YCA inmate has the
opportunity to receive a short prison term which will expire before
his guideline range, the YCA inmate has no such opportunity, nor
has he any expectations of early release if he shows evidence of
rehabilitation.
14
A recent district court case, Buckhannon v. Hambrick,1
demonstrates a situation when a youth offender may serve a longer
term than a young person given a regular adult sentence. In Buckhannon, the defendant was convicted of a number of armed robberies, apparently prompted to some -degree by his addiction to
narcotics. Believing that the defendant could be rehabilitated, and
anticipating that he would receive a twenty to twenty-seven month
guideline range, the district court sentenced the defendant to an
indeterminate term as a young adult offender. The Parole Commisson thereupon categorized the inmate's offense behavior as
"greatest I" and required a term of imprisonment of over forty
months. Expressing its frustration with the parole guidelines, the
court noted that had it accurately foreseen the Commission's
guideline decision, it would have ignored the YCA and sentenced
113. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(h)(2) (1981). Like the Parole Commission, the Bureau of Prisons has attempted in the past to treat YCA inmates in a manner identical to adult prisoners. Beginning in 1976, the Bureau of Prisons ended the designation of certain of its facilities as "federal youth centers" and began housing youth and adult offenders together. Watts
v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1359 (10th Cir. 1981); Partridge, Chaset & Eldridge, The Sentencing Options of Federal District Judges, 84 F.R.D. 175, 201-02 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Partridge]. A number of court decisions followed, declaring the Bureau's policy to be a
violation of the requirement that YCA offenders be separated from adult prisoners. See
United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978); Brown v. Carlson, 431 F.
Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977). The Bureau thereupon altered its policy and established YCA
units in federal institutions. In such units, inmates are segregated during sleep hours and
during participation in certain youth offender programs, but are otherwise mixed with
adults. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d at 1356. Most of the programs available to youth offenders are also available to adult offenders. Partridge, supra this note, at 202. In January, 1982,
presumably in response to the holding in Watts v. Hadden that this Bureau policy failed to
comply with the segregation requirement of the YCA, the Bureau announced its intention to
reconstitute separate YCA facilities. 47 Fed. Reg. 3752, 31,248 (1982) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 524.20). See United States v. Hudson, 667 F.2d 767, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1982).
114. 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

694

Loyola University Law journal

the prisoner to a shorter adult sentence."

[Vol. 13

5

Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act
The Parole Commission also applies its youth guidelines to offenders, young and old, who are sentenced under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA)."' Under the Act, narcotic addicts
meeting certain eligibility criteria may be sentenced to "treatment" if the court finds that the offender is likely to be "rehabilitated."' 7 The sentence imposed must be an indeterminate term
not to exceed ten years, or the maximum term which otherwise
could be imposed if the maximum is less than ten years."' This
indeterminate sentencing provision was designed to allow authorities flexibility in treating addicts while providing a "lengthy period
of sentence for those recalcitrant offenders who do not respond to
treatment." 9
An offender committed under NARA may not be released until
he has been treated for at least six months. At any time thereafter,
the Attorney General may certify by report to the Parole Commissioner whether the offender should be conditionally released under
supervision. After receipt of the Attorney General's report, and a
certification by the Bureau of Prisons that the prisoner has made
115. Id. at 44.
116. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 4253 (1976). An "eligible offender" is defined as any individual who is
convicted of an offense against the United States, but does not include:
(1) an offender who is convicted of a crime of violence.
(2) an offender who is convicted of unlawfully importing or selling or conspiring
to import or sell a narcotic drug, unless the court determines that such sale was
for the primary purpose of enabling the offender to obtain a narcotic drug which
he requires for his personal use because of his addiction to such drug.
(3) an offender against whom there is pending a prior charge of a felony which
has not been finally determined or who is on probation or whose sentence following conviction on such a charge, including any time on parole or mandatory release, has not been fully served: Provided, that an offender on probation, parole,
or mandatory release shall be included if the authority authorized to require his
return to custody consents to his commitment.
(4) an offender who has been convicted of a felony on two or more prior
occasions.
(5) an offender who has been committed under Title I of the Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Act of 1966, under this chapter, under the District of Columbia
Code, or under any State proceeding because of narcotic addiction on three or
more occasions.
Id. § 4251(0.
118. Id. § 4253(a).
119. H.R. REP. No. 1486, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4245, 4252.
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sufficient progress to warrant release, the Parole Commission may
order release."'0
Under the Youth-NARA guidelines, the characteristics of the
addict's offense and prior record, rather than his rehabilitation,
govern release. The guidelines provide a benefit for the adult
NARA prisoner, since the expected period of incarceration under
the guideline range is less for NARA inmates than under the regular adult guidelines. 12 1 The NARA inmate, however, receives this
benefit at the cost of the removal of the trial judge's discretion to
impose a shorter term of imprisonment. Moreover, the NARA statute provides a hurdle to release above and beyond the guidelines:
the certification that the inmate has made progress sufficient to
warrant conditional release.1 22 Thus, inmates with early guideline
release dates, who fail to receive certification quickly, stand to
serve longer terms than inmates sentenced to regular adult
sentences. 123 In short, the Parole Commission's administration of
YCA and NARA sentences has rendered a defense request to im24
pose such a sentence a risky and needless choice.
Immediate Parole Eligibility
For the inmate sentenced as an adult, the guidelines have produced a notable change by diminishing the effect of a sentence
that provides for immediate parole eligibility. At present, the court
sentencing an adult offender to a term in excess of one year possesses limited discretion to determine the parole eligiblity date.
Under a "regular" adult sentence, the inmate is eligible for parole

120. The statute, as drafted, provided for certification by the Surgeon General of the
United States. The responsibility of the Surgeon General to certify sufficient progress has
been delegated to the Bureau of Prisons. See United States Bureau of Prisons, Program
Statement 5330.5 1092 (1979); Partridge, supra note 113, at 206.
121. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1981). For example, adult guidelines provide a customary
range of imprisonment of 14-20 months for an individual with a "high" offense severity and
a "very good" salient factor category; the Youth/NARA guidelines provide for a 12-16
month range for the offender with a similar severity and salielit factor score.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 4254 (1976). A certificate is issued upon successful completion of a drug
abuse program. Partridge, supra note 113, at 206.
123. Partridge, supra note 113, at 206.
124. The conditions of incarceration for NARA inmates do not vary significantly from
those of regular adult inmates. The current Bureau of Prisons policy is to provide inmates,
whether or not committed under NARA, with an opportunity to participate in drug treatment programs. While special drug treatment units exist at some Bureau facilities, they are
not restricted to NARA inmates. A NARA sentence does differ from an adult term in that
NARA inmates are expected to participate in the drug programs. See United States Bureau
of Prisons, Program Statement 5330.5 1080 (1979); Partridge, supra note 113, at 206.
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after serving one-third of the sentence. 125 If the court decides that
the prisoner should become eligible before this time, it may designate an earlier parole date or may specify that the prisoner is immediately eligible for parole. The authority for granting immediate
parole eligibility is now codified in the United States Code, title
eighteen, section 4205(b)(2); hence, the common term for this type
of sentence is a "(b)(2)" sentence.
Congress had rehabilitative goals in mind when it granted courts
128
the power to dispense with statutory eligibility limitations.
Under this provision, immediate parole eligibility would be granted
when, in the court's judgment, "it might reasonably be expected to
facilitate the rehabilitation of the prisoner. 1 2 7 Many judges imposing (b)(2) sentences contemplated that, while a (b)(2) sentence did
not per se require early parole, it did contemplate an "individualized" decision based upon1 2 the
inmate's adjustment to confinement
8
and readiness for release.
Application of the parole release guidelines to (b)(2) sentences
changed, at least publicly, the criteria thought to be used in the
release decision. While the district court may still recommend individualized treatment to the Parole Commission through the imposition of a (b)(2) sentence, it is now clear that "rehabilitation plays
a minor part in the Commission's decision, and has no special significance for (b)(2) prisoners. 12 9 Thus, prisoners with (b)(2)

125. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976).
126. This power was granted to district judges in 1958. See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-752, § 3, 72 Stat. 845 (1958).
127. S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3894, 3986 (statement of Warren Olney, Director, Administrative Office of United
States Courts presented before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary at
Hearings on Apr. 30, 1958, on H.R.J. Res. 424, H.R.J. Res. 425, & H.R. 8923). See also
Grasso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1975); Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212, 1216-17
(7th Cir. 1974).
128. See Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (7th Cir. 1974), and sources cited
therein. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) was recodified in 1976 as § 4205(b)(2). See Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, supra note 111.
129. Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1979). Prior to 1976, authorities questioned whether the application of the guidelines to defendants with (b)(2) sentences would
provide inmates with the individualized parole consideration contemplated by the authors
of the indeterminate sentencing option. Grasso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Feinberg, J., concurring and dissenting); Project, supra note 17, at 891. See also Garafola v.
Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974). In the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act, supra note 111, Congress authorized the Commission's use of guidelines, and proclaimed no exception for (b)(2) prisoners from the general standards required for release.
See 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976). Relying on this legislative statement, courts have upheld the
application of the guidelines to post-1976 inmates with (b)(2) sentences. Hayward v. United
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sentences can expect to be released within the same guidelines as
regular adult prisoners. Only when the guidelines call for an incarceration period that is less than, one-third of the entire sentence
will (b)(2) prisoners receive an earlier release date. 30
Relative Culpability
The preceding section demonstrated the effects of the Commission's rejection of rehabilitation and its move to sentencing decisions based upon retribution and incapacitation. Although much
attention has focused on this change in function, the categories
chosen by the Commission to measure retribution and incapacitation have also had a major impact upon federal sentencing practice. Certain aspects of culpability have been depreciated in the
guidelines, whereas others have received new emphasis. Judges
who have imposed individualized sentences for factors not considered in the guidelines have seen these sentences "modified" by Parole Commission policies.
One of the most notable among the Commission's policies is its
decision to ignore the relative culpability of co-defendants in the
offense severity scale. The severity ratings do not distinguish
among defendants based upon the degree of their intent or volition. As a result, the impulsive addict-robber acting to support his
habit will receive the same offense treatment as the professional
thief. While the Commission could use differences in relative culpability to justify a decision above or below the guidelines, it has
done so in only a small minority of cases. The view that the relative gravity of the roles of co-defendants should be given minimal
significance is not shared by many sentencing judges. Thus, courts
may impose carefully calibrated sentences after finding one defendant less culpable than another, only to learn that the disparity
has been nullified by the Parole Commission.'
Total Offense Behavior
The Commission's policy decisions have also had an impact upon
prosecutorial and defense conduct in the plea bargaining process.
As noted, the Commission bases its assessment of offense severity
States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 857, 860-61 (8th Cir. 1981); Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434
(2d Cir. 1979); Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666, 668-70 (5th Cir. 1979); Wilden v. Fields,
510 F. Supp. 1295, 1307 (W.D. Ws. 1981).
130. Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1979).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Manderville, 396 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Conn. 1975).
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not upon the crime of conviction but upon "offense behavior."
Thus, the criminal defendant who has apparently committed a
bank robbery and has been allowed to plead to larceny will have
his offense severity rated as robbery, "very high," just as if he had
been convicted of the offense. In making this determination, the
Commission may consider counts dismissed pursuant to plea
1 32
bargaining.
The Commission's policy is consciously designed to influence the
effect of plea bargaining by "preventing disparities in the
prosecutorial practices from being transferred to . . .the point at
which the offender is finally released from prison." s A defense attorney's "ability" to secure the dismissal of several counts in a
multi-count indictment may have little practical effect if the Commission considers the dismissed counts in deciding the inmate's release date. For the attorney involved in plea bargaining, a prosecutor's offer to dismiss several counts in a multi-count indictment
should be considerably less appealing than it might have been
years ago.
No matter how laudable the Commission's attempt to reduce
prosecutorial disparity may seem to some, its efforts have been
perceived as unfair by sentencing participants. Defendants who
have given up their right to trial in order to secure the dismissal of
certain counts of an indictment often believe that the bargain includes the requirement that the government not treat them as
guilty of the dismissed offenses. " The reliance on unadjudicated
offenses may seem particularly unfair in cases where the prosecutor's decision to bargain results from perceived weaknesses in the
government's case or the existence of a strong defense to the major
charge."'5 Whatever the reasons for the bargain, unless the defense
attorney takes pains to establish a record at sentencing contesting
the underlying offense, his client runs the risk of having the Parole
Commission treat him as guilty of such offense because of the pros132. "Information in the file describing offense circumstances more severe than reflected
by the offense of conviction (for example, information contained in a count of an indictment
that was dismissed as a result of a plea agreement) may be relied upon to select an appropriately higher severity rating.. ." PRocEDURES MANUAL, supra note 37, app. 4 at 122. See,
e.g., Billiteri v. United States 8d. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 940, 942-44 (2d Cir. 1976); Bistram v. United States Bd. of Parole, 535 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1976); Manos v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 399 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
133. 44 Fed. Reg. 26,549 (1979) (Parole Commission statement on use of "offense behavior"), reprinted in Partridge, supra note 113, at 212.
134. See Alschuler, Parole Release Guidelines, supra note 10, at 241-42.
135. Id.
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ecutor's description of the offense in the PIR.
3e

Guideline Avoidance

It should not be a surprise that the aims of sentencing participants have clashed with those of the Parole Commission. To some
extent, the roles of the Commission and defense counsel will necessarily conflict. While the Commission seeks to reduce disparity, defense counsel's role at sentencing must be to emphasize those facts
about the client which call for disparate treatment. It should also
be no surprise that the Commission's policies conflict with judicial
aims. Many judges feel it is their responsibility, not the Commission's, to make specific findings concerning retribution and incapacitation. Because of these diverging views, sentencing participants have attempted to anticipate the Commission's guideline
decisions, and to craft sentences to avoid their impact.
Judges, for instance, possess more than enough tools to frustrate
the impact of Parole Commission guidelines. The most obvious
way a judge may avoid conflict with parole guidelines is to impose
a sentence which is not administered by the Commission. In fact,
approximately seventy percent of federal sentences are of this variety. 187 One such sentence is a term of probation. Probation subjects the defendant to a period of supervision of up to five years by
the United States Probation Office. If the defendant violates probation, the court possesses the authority to order him to prison.,"
For those defendants who must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the court may avoid the jurisdiction of the Parole
Commission by imposing a sentence of one year or less. There are
under one year: a "regular" sentence, a
three forms of sentences
"split" sentence,"3 9 and a sentence "as if on parole."' 40 If the court
imposes a regular sentence of under a year, the defendant's release
date will be the stated time of the sentence minus "good time."' 4 '
If the court wishes to impose a term of incarceration, yet provide
136. The coining of the term "guideline avoidance" and the first analysis of the phenomenon was completed by Professor Curtis. See Curtis, supra note 14, at 106-09.
137. The Commission only exercises jurisdiction over inmates sentenced to terms in excess of one year. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976). In the past, only 30% of federal sentences have
fallen into this category. See ADmimmmnIv OFFICE OF Tm U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL PaOFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1978 ANNUAL
For, table D-7 at app. 86-87; ADmmwrarAi
REPORT, table D-7 at app. 89 (1978); Curtis, supra note 14, at 116 n.32.
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 3653 (1976).
139. Id. § 3651.
140. Id. § 4205(f).
141. See id. § 4161. (specifying amount of good time available for federal sentences).
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for community supervision, it may impose a "split" sentence.
Under a "split" sentence, the defendant may be required to serve
up to six months followed by a term of probation, with a total time
of up to five years.""' Only where probation is violated and where
the defendant is sentenced to a prison term of greater than one
year will the Parole Commission's jurisdiction commence.
Still another way for the court to avoid Parole Commission jurisdiction, yet provide for a period of incarceration plus a period of
supervision, is to impose a sentence "as if on parole." Under this
statutory authority, the court may impose a sentence of from six
months to one year and prescribe that the inmate be released, as if
on parole, after serving one-third of the sentence.",3 The statute
has been interpreted as permitting the court to specify release at
any point after one-third of the sentence has been served, and
before the expiration of the one year sentence. 44 Thus, the court
may impose a sentence of greater than six months combined with a
short release period, a combination not possible under a split
4
sentence. '
As noted, these sentencing options-probation, split sentences,
sentences of one year or less and sentences as if on parole-account for approximately seventy percent of all federal
sentences. 46 With respect to all of these sentences, the Parole
Commission will be without jurisdiction to impose its guidelines. In
the other thirty percent of the cases, counsel may still attempt to
secure a disposition to avoid application of the guidelines. The
simplest means is to urge a sentence to a term which expires before
the applicable guideline range. If the court believes that the guideline term provides for a greater period of incarceration than is reasonable, the court may impose a term that expires, with "good
time," below the expected guideline range. Approximately fifteen
47
percent of federal sentences over one year are of this variety."
The court may also impose a "mixed" sentence, a short term
under one count, accompanied by a term of probation on another
count. By so doing, the court will guarantee the defendant a period
of imprisonment under one year as well as a substantial period "on
the street" under supervision.
142. Id. § 3651.
143. Id. § 4205(f).
144.
145.

United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
Id. at 692-93.

146. See supra note 137.
147.

See supra note 45.
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Finally, prosecutors and defense attorneys have attempted to
anticipate the guideline effects in plea bargaining practice. Some
defense attorneys have sought assurance, as part of a plea bargain,
that the prosecutor will not represent to the Parole Commission
that the defendant committed particular types of aggravating behavior.14 8 This kind of information bargaining creates the potential
for circumventing the Commission's total offense behavior rating
as well as its efforts to reduce disparity in the plea bargaining
process.
PROBLEMS IN GUIDELINE PREDICTION

The ability to tailor a criminal plea or sentence that anticipates
the parole guidelines presupposes an accurate prediction of how
the Commission will apply its guidelines. As noted, despite the
publication of the guidelines and the Commission's efforts to make
guideline application as certain as possible, " " accurate forecasts of
the Commission's actions are often difficult.
Studies by the Commission and the GAO have shown that the
Commission's guideline scoring is often unreliable. A study by the
Commission's research unit found that in approximately twenty
percent of the cases studied there was disagreement between the
150
hearing examiner's conclusions and those of the research unit.
The GAO results were more startling: it found that in a sample of
thirty cases given to thirty-five hearing examiners, there was disagreement among the examiners in every case. 5 1 In all but one case,
the examiners found two to five different severity levels; further, in
only one case did all examiners agree on the salient factor score.18"2
One of the reasons for this inconsistency, the inaccuracy of information transmitted to the Commission, has already been noted.
148. See United States v. Cook, 668 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1982) (government promise to
offer "nothing in aggravation" breached by probation officer's access to damaging information in United States Attorney's file); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (agreement not to represent that offenses amounted to more than $2,000 in value). In
Cook, the court questioned the propriety of a prosecutorial agreement to withhold relevant
information from the probation office or court. Cook, 668 F.2d at 320 n.4. See also U.S.
DzP'T Op JuSTIcE, PRINCHnMs OF FMMRAL PROSBCc'ON 46 (198)) (an attorney for the government should cooperate with probation service in preparation of the PIR).
149. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text. See also 42 Fed. Reg. 31,784 (1977).
150. P. HOFFMAN, INrmAL HEAuNoS, supra note 61, at 4. The Commission's study concluded that in a majority of cases in which the guideline scores disagreed, the difference was
"not likely to have affected the actual release-decision." Id.
151. See FrDottAL PuOL PRAcTacms, supra note 75, at 15, 22.
152. Id. at 22. In 28 of the 30 cases, the difference in guideline interpretation resulted in
disparity of over one year in the recommended release date.
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Another cause may be due to vagueness in the guideline criteria. In
the past, the guidelines have failed to include many federal crimes
in the offense severity scale. Probation officers and defense attorneys estimating the treatment of an unincluded offense have been
left with only the general nostrum that "the proper category may
be obtained by comparing the severity of the offense behavior with
those of similar offense behaviors listed," or that, if more than one
severity fits, the most severe one should be used.15 3 Significantly, a
revision of the guidelines effective January 31, 1983, will respond
to this problem by including a number of formerly unlisted crimes
in the offense severity table.'"
A more confusing feature of the guidelines is the policy regarding multiple separate offenses. The Commission provides little guidance about how it will rate an individual convicted of multiple
separate offenses beyond the statement that it "may," in its discretion, 5 5 increase the offense severity. The breadth of discretion
lodged in hearing examiners in multiple offense situations has
therefore created the opportunity to manipulate offense severity
ratings. 56
Even if counsel and the sentencing courts are able to predict the
guideline range, the Parole Commission can render discretionary
decisions above the guidelines, and does so in approximately ten
percent of the cases. 5 7 Thus, counsel will be able to predict the
Commission's behavior with certainty only by knowing in advance
those cases in which the Commission may exceed its guidelines.
The Commission's guideline application manual does specify some
types of offense behavior and parole factors which merit decisions
above the guidelines. Nevertheless, the Commission's standards are
considerably general in nature.
For example, the Commission will render decisions above the
guidelines in cases where it finds the offense behavior unusually

153.
154.
155.

28 C.F.R. § 2.20 notes B, C (1981).
47 Fed. Reg. 56,334-41 (1982); see infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. § 2.20 note D (1981). In a recent amendment to its Rules and Procedures

Manual, the Commission included a chart to "provide guidance in assessing whether the
severity of multiple offenses is sufficient to raise the offense level." RULES AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL, supra note 37, at 168 (rev. June 1, 1982). Regrettably, the chart is not included in
the guidelines published in the Code of Federal Regulations.
156. "More commonly, offense severity ratings rather than salient factor scores are
manipulated to avoid explicit decisions outside the Guidelines." Project, supra note 17, at

838.
157.

See PAROLE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 22.
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sophisticated or of unusual magnitude.1 5 8 While the Commission
seems to pay particular attention to conspiracy offenses in general
and narcotics conspiracies in particular," 9 a wide variety of cases
can be grouped under this umbrella.
One consideration relating to the salient factor score which justifies a decision over the guidelines is whether an offender has an
unusually extensive record. 160 For example, a prisoner with four
prior convictions will score a zero for the salient factor which considers prior convictions. If an inmate has a more extensive record,
the only way available for the Commission to reflect that the inmate is a poorer risk than the zero rating indicates is to score the
" '
inmate outside the guidelines.16
Finally, counsel and the court may not anticipate the final guideline decision where the guidelines current at the time of sentencing
are subsequently changed under the Commission's regulatory mandate to review and modify its guidelines.' When modifications occur, the ultimate parole guideline decision may prescribe more incarceration than any of the parties could have anticipated. 6 3
As a result of the uncertainty of guideline predictions, courts
have attempted to retain jurisdiction of cases in order to monitor
the Commission's performance. Such action is feasible by a motion
to reduce sentence under rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 35 permits a defendant to file a motion for modification of sentence within 120 days of sentencing or within 120 days
of the expiration of a direct appeal. Since most initial parole hearings may be held within 120 days of commitment, 4 any defendant
who has begun serving a sentence while taking an appeal will have
received a parole decision well before the expiration of time for a
rule 35 motion. In these cases, a motion may be filed and the court

158. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 37, at 125-26, app. 4.
159. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Putnam, 591 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1979) (cocaine conspiracy);
Smaldone v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Kan. 1978) (gambling and cocaine
conspiracy); Stoller v. Tennant, 448 F. Supp. 712, 714 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (cocaine conspiracy);
Foddrell v. Sigler, 418 F. Supp. 324, 325 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (heroin conspiracy).
160. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 37, at 126, app. 4.
161. Other reasons for setting a parole date beyond the guidelines include a finding that
the inmate has a history of assaultive behavior, an on-going pattern of criminal violations
over a period of years, or a history of repeated parole failures. See PROCEDURES MANUAL,
supra note 37, at 126, app. 4.
162. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(g) (1981).
163. See United States v. Tully, 521 F. Supp. 331, 336 (D.N.J. 1981); United States v.
DeMier, 520 F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
164. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1981).
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may adjust a sentence after the Parole Commission's decision. In
cases where the beginning of the sentence corresponds to the beginning of the running of time to file a rule 35 motion, it may still
be possible to secure a modification of sentence after the parole
decision, so long as the rule 35 motion is timely filed before the
expiration of the 120 days.'" Thus, if the defendant files his motion shortly before the termination of the 120 days, the court may
withhold decision pending the Parole Commission's initial guideline decision. Courts have used rule 35 in this manner to maintain
jurisdiction to monitor the Commission's performance until the initial parole decision, and later, throughout the administrative remedy process. 1e" Where disagreements with the Parole Commission
over the use of its guidelines have occurred, federal judges have
reduced prison terms,1e7 imposed probationary sentences, 68 or ordered release.'" e
In sum, the Commission's efforts to reduce disparity and to impose its sentencing philosophy have been met by an effort by some
participants in sentencing to maintain control over the process. In
the present scheme, at least, the success of the Commission in reducing overall disparity is not free from doubt.
SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

The parole guideline system was implemented during a period of
continuing concern over the fairness of federal sentencing practices.17 0 The calls for sentence reform have found recent expression
165. Courts have held that rule 35 permits a sentencing court to decide the motion after
the 120 day period, as long as it is filed within 120 days. United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d
89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir. 1975);
Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967). See 8A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACriCE 135.02[2] (2d ed. 1981).
166. United States v. Snooks, 493 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
167. United States v. Benson, 75 Cr. 538 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1977) (available on Laxs,
Genfed library, Dist file); United States v. Jackson, 410 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Md. 1976); United
States v. Manderville, 396 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Conn. 1975).
168. United States v. Sinkfield, 484 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
169. United States v. Wigoda, 417 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. IM.1976).
170. See, e.g., A. VoN HmcSH & K. HANERAAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION,
REFoRm OR ABOLITION (1979); Alachuler, ProsecutorialPower, supra note 6; Bazelon, Missed
Opportunities in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 57 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Bazelon]; Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability,and
Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J. 975 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Coffee]; Curtis, supra note 14; Hoffman & Stover, supra note 4; Morris, Towards
PrincipledSentencing, 37 MD. L. Rev. 267 (1977); Orland, supra note 9; Schulhofer, supra
note 6; Schwartz, Options in Constructing a Sentencing System: Sentencing Guidelines
Under Legislative or JudicialHegemony, 67 VA. L. Rav. 637 (1981); Skirvseth, supra note
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in a number of congressional proposals for revision of the federal
sentencing statutes. 7 ' One such proposal, originally part of the
Senate's omnibus criminal code revision bill, 72 has now surfaced in
both Houses as part of the Violent Crime and Drug Enforcement
Improvements Act of 1982.17 If enacted, the bill would mandate
far-reaching changes. It would specify, for the first time, the purposes of sentencing.174 It would also provide a mechanism for the
development and use of guidelines for judges in the sentencing
process.1' Finally, the proposed legislation would mandate a phas10; Tjoflat, A Practical Look at the Sentencing Provisions of S. 1722, 72 J. CruM. L. &
555 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tjoflat]; Tonry, The Sentencing Commission
in Sentencing Reform, 7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 315 (1979).
171. See, e.g., S. 2572, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. 2572]; H.R.
6497, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 64971.
Prior to the introduction of S. 2572 and H.R. 6497, the sentencing reform proposals were
included as part of the omnibus federal criminal code revision bills. Five such bills have
been introduced in the 97th Congress. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited
as S. 1630]; H.R. 5679, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5679]; H.R.
5703, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5703]; H.R. 4711, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 4711]; H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1647]. S. 1630 was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee but
has failed thus far to reach the Senate floor for debate. See 128 CONG. REc. 522 (daily ed.
Jan. 25, 1982); 128 CONG. REc. S4004-07 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1982). None of the House Bills
has even been reported from committee in this session.
The efforts to reform the federal criminal code revision bill have now spanned a decade.
In 1971, the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws (the "Brown
Commission") issued a proposed federal criminal code. In 1973, the first legislative recodification attempt, S.1, was introduced in the Senate. S.1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). S.1 was
reintroduced in 1975, S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and was succeeded in 1977 by S. 1437
and its counterpart in the House of Representatives, H.R. 6869. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). S. 1437 was the first of the recodification measures to contain detailed sentencing reform provisions. The bill passed the Senate,
124 CONG. REc. 1463 (1978), but died in committee in the House. In 1980, the judiciary
committees of both houses of Congress reported on new bills to revise the federal criminal
code, neither of which was passed. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. (1980); H.R. 6915, 96th
Cong., 2d Ses. (1980).
172. S. 1630, supra note 171.
173. See S. 2572, supra note 171; H.R. 6497, supra note 171. Because the Senate and
House versions of the bills are identical in all relevant respects, only the Senate version will
be cited throughout. The article will also provide parallel citations to the relevant sections
of S. 1630, supra note 171, the criminal code revision bill still pending in the Senate.
174. See S. 2572, supra note 171, tit. V, sec. 502, 9 3553(a); S. 1630, supra note 171, tit.
I, §2003(a).
175. See S. 2572, supra note 171, tit. V, sec. 502, 9 3553, sec. 507, §§ 991-998; S. 1630,
supra note 171, tit. I, § 2003, tit. III, sec. 126, §§ 991-998. The Senate's guideline setting
body would be the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent commission with
seven voting members. Four of the members would be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Senate. The other three members would be federal judges chosen by the
President from a list submitted by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
Two of the House criminal code reform proposals introduced in the 97th Congress also
CRIMINOLOGY
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ing out of the Parole Commission and move
all the authority for
76
the sentencing decision to the trial court.
Ironically, the Commission's action in implementing the guidelines has played a part in this call for its abolition. The Commission's abandonment of the rehabilitative model, while applauded
by many, left it with a primary function duplicative of the judicial
sentencing decision. As a result of this perceived redundancy, some
critics have called for the Commission's abolition.177 The Commission has responded by arguing that the guidelines are still impor178
tant as a means of reducing unwarranted sentence disparity.
Critics, in turn, have asserted that the Parole Commission is
neither a desirable nor a necessary body within which to place the
disparity reduction mechanism. Additionally, commentators have
noted that, since the Commission reviews only those sentences exceeding one year-some thirty percent of present federal
sentences-it is powerless to moderate undue disparity in seventy
179
percent of the cases.

The current parole guideline system has even been accused of
increasing sentencing disparity by tolerating, and at times encouraging, the guideline manipulation described in this article.8 0 Some
call for the use of sentencing guidelines by the district court. The House bills differ by
mandating the Judicial Conference of the United States to propose sentencing guidelines.
The guidelines would be transmitted to Congress, and would take effect within 180 days
unless disapproved. H.R. 5679, supra note 171; H.R. 1647, supra note 171, tit. I, § 4301(a).
The bills would also establish a committee on sentencing appointed by the Judicial Conference to collect data and recommend guidelines to the Judicial Conference. H.R. 5679, supra
note 171, tit. I, §§ 4303-4304; H.R. 1647, supra note 171, tit. I, §§ 4303-4304.
176. See S.2572, supra note 171, tit. V, sec. 508(a)(3) (repealing parole chapter) & sec.
525(b) (phase-out of Commission); S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. IV, sec. 134(b); S. REP. No.
307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 955-75 (1981).
Several of the House versions of the criminal code revision provide for continued Parole
Commission jurisdiction. H.R. 5703, supra note 171, tit. I, §§ 4701-4716; H.R. 4711, supra
note 171, tit. I, §§ 4701-4717; see H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 505-34 (1980).
But see H.R. 5679, supra note 171, tit. I, § 4716 (providing for termination of Parole Commission 5 years after sentencing guidelines take effect).
177. See, e.g., Alachuler, ParoleRelease Guidelines,supra note 10, at 238-40; Marvin E.
Frankel, remarks on Sentencing Provisions of the Proposed Federal Code at the Plenary
Session of the Association of American Law Schools (Dec. 28, 1977), reprinted in Current
Developments in Judicial Administration,80 F.R.D. 147, 156-57 [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Newman, A Better Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A.J. 1562 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Newman]. See also S. REP. No. 307, supra note 176, at 971-72.
178. See McCall, supra note 33, at 4-7; SELEcTED Rmiurrs vol. II, supra note 33, at 4245.
179. See, e.g., S. Rzp. No. 307, supra note 176, at 963. See also Curtis, supra note 14, at
107; Skrivseth, supra note 10, at 290.
180. See S. Rzp. No. 307, supra note 176, at 959: "[T]he existence of the Parole Com-
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trial judges sentence defendants in the hope of circumventing the
impact of the guidelines. In fact, approximately twenty-five percent of sentences over one year either end before the guideline period, or do not provide for parole eligibility until after the guideline range.1 81 Arguably, the result of these manipulations may be to

increase sentence disparity at the sentencing level, cancelling out
the reduction in disparity at the Parole Commission level.
Critics have also asserted that the Commission's espoused disparity reduction functions will be unnecessary after promulgation
of detailed sentencing guidelines. 182 Judges and commentators
have stated that the proper way to mete out just punishment and
reduce unwarranted disparity is to establish a structured judicial
sentencing system, 8 3 not to rely on an administrative parole process that is ill-suited to adequate factfinding.1'4
The alternative to the Parole Commission, first proposed in the
Senate, is a system of detailed sentencing guidelines promulgated
by a sentencing commission and applied by district courts.1 85 Although the exact shape of the sentencing guidelines is unclear, it
has been suggested that they might take a form somewhat similar
to the grid of the Parole Commission guidelines."'8 The proposed
statute would require sentencing judges to impose a sentence
within the appropriate guideline range absent an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that was not adequately considered by the
sentencing commission.187 The sentence imposed would then correspond almost exactly with the sentence served. The prisoner would
mission may actually invite judicial fluctuation by encouraging judges to sentence with the
availability of parole in mind." See also Partridge, Changes in Prison and Parole Policies:
How Should the Judge Respond? 45 FED. PROBATION 15 (June 1981).

181. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Revision of the FederalCriminal Code: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 1901-02
(1979) (Hon. Harold R. Tyler); S. Rzp. No. 307, supra note 176, at 970 n.66; Skrivseth,
supra note 10, at 298, 300.
183. See Frankel, supra note 177, at 157: "The idea of a parole board or commission
serving in effect to review the judges was not sound when it was more or less covert; it does
not improve as an express proposition." See also Newman, supra note 176, at 1566: "By
using the table, the commission acknowledges it is not making release decisions based on
rehabilitation. It is simply selecting appropriate lengths of time to be served for various
combinations of offense severity and offender characteristics. That is, or ought to be, the
essence of a sentencing decision."
184. Alschuler, Parole Release Guidelines, supra note 10, at 239.
185. See supra note 175.
186. Tjoflat, supra note 170, at 558 n.22, 616 .
187. S.2572, supra note 171, tit. V, sec. 502, § 3553(b); S.1630, supra note 171, tit. I,
§2003(b).
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be able to shorten his term of imprisonment only by receipt of
"good time" of up to ten percent of his sentence each year, or by a
very limited right to petition the court for review of the sentence.1 88 Youth Corrections Act and Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act sentences would be eliminated, and the Parole Commission would be phased out."'9
This sentencing guideline scheme possesses a number of tempting advantages. It shifts the guideline determination to the trial
court, a forum well-suited to factfinding. It eliminates the Youth
Corrections Act and the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act,
thereby ending the disharmony caused by the use of a determinate
sentence system for sentences rehabilitative in origin. The proposal
also eliminates sparring between the Parole Commission and the
court over the appropriate length of sentence.
Despite these seeming benefits, there are reasons to be wary of
the unitary sentencing guideline model. One concern is that the
scheme will reduce unwarranted judicial discretion only to increase
the effects of prosecutorial discretion. Our sentencing system contains at least five components: the police, the prosecutor, the
judge, the Parole Commission, and the Bureau of Prisons. Experience with parole guidelines has shown that the roles of the parties
within the process are interdependent, and that attempts to eliminate disparity in one portion of the system may increase the likelihood of disparity caused by decisions in other branches. Thus,
while the Parole Commission has endeavored to reduce disparity
through the guidelines in its part of the system, judges in disagreement with the Commission's sentencing philosophy have tailored
their sentences to avoid these guidelines by imposing, for example,
very short sentences to require release before the guideline
period. 90
Imposition of guidelines by a proposed sentencing commission
could cause analogous shifts of power within the criminal justice

188. S. 2572, supra note 171, tit. V, sec. 502, §§ 3582(c), 3624(b); S. 1630, supra note 171,
tit. I, §§ 2302(c), 3824(b); see S. REP. No. 307, supra note 176, at 972-73, 1249.
189. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 176, at 972 n.68, 1340; see S. 2572, supra note 171, tit.
V, sec. 502, § 3581(b) & sec. 525(b); S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. I, § 2301, tit. IV, sec. 134(b).
The bills reject separate sentencing statutes for youths and addicts, and instead instruct the
Sentencing Commission to consider the effect that age and drug dependence should have on
the "nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence." S. 2572,
supra note 171, tit. V, sec. 507, § 994(d); S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. III, sec. 126, § 994(d);
S. RaP. No. 307, supra note 176, at 1340.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 125-49.
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system from judges to prosecutors. Federal prosecutors already
possess considerable power over the sentencing decision. United
States Attorneys exercise discretion in deciding whether to prosecute, what charges to bring, and whether to reduce charges or enter
a plea bargain. In exercising these powers, prosecutors already
have great ability to determine the sentence actually imposed.1 9' In
the present system, however, prosecutorial power to set the actual
sentence can be moderated by both the trial court, which is empowered to impose a wide range of sentences, and by the Parole
Commission, which attempts to base its offense severity rating on
the actual offense committed rather than the one charged. 19
The Sentencing Commission scheme would eliminate the Parole
Commission's ability to moderate disparity and might reduce the
court's moderating ability as well. The proposal directs the sentencing commission to establish guidelines based upon "each category of offense involving each category of defendant." 19 Although
there will surely be some basis for aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the presumptive sentence, in one commentator's
words, is "directly tied" to the charges to which a defendant pleads
guilty. 1 ' Thus, the effect of the sentence guidelines could be to
decrease judicial discretion to vary a sentence for a single charge
and to increase the importance of the prosecutor's discretion in selecting a charge. Even more important, the system would increase
the bargaining leverage of the prosecutor by magnifying the effect
of a prosecutor's willingness to reduce charges during plea
95
bargaining.'
191. See, e.g., CoMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OtncE, REDUCING FEDERAL
JUmICLL SENTENCING AND PROSECUTING DISPARITIES; A SYSTEM-WIDE APPROACH NEEDED 15-

16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REDUCING DISPARITIES]; Tjoflat, supra note 170, at 619 n.258.
192. See REDUCING DisPAitrrIs, supra note 191, at 20; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 74243; Tjoflat, supra note 170, at 620-21.

193. S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. III, sec. 126, § 994(b). See S. 2572, supra note 171, tit.
V,sec. 507, § 994(b).
194. Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 6869, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 2338 (1978) (statement of Matthew T. Heartney, Yale Law School)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 6869).
195. There have been frequent expressions of concern that the Senate's sentencing
scheme will increase disparity by limiting judicial discretion while at the same time leaving
prosecutorial discretion intact. See Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra note 194, at 595-96
(Thomas Emerson, Yale Law School), 1934 (Judge James M. Burns), 2224 (Cecil C. McCall,
Chairman, U.S. Parole Commission), 2264-65 (John J. Cleary, on behalf of Nat'l Legal Aid
and Defender Ass'n), 2324-29 (Daniel J. Freed, Yale Law School), 2336-40 (Matthew T.
Heartney, Yale Law School), 2356-57 (G. LaMarr Howard, Natl Ass'n of Blacks in Criminal
Justice), 2462-73 (William Anderson, Gen. Acct. Off.), 2474 (Judge Morris E. Lasker); RE-
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The Senate Judiciary Committee has recognized the possibility
that the scheme may increase the effects of prosecutorial disparity.
Its answer to this problem includes relying upon the sentencing
court's power under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to reject a charge reduction bargain, and requiring the sentencing commission to issue "policy statements" with regard to
plea acceptance. 96 The efficacy of this approach is, of course, entirely unknown. It is arguable, however, that the power to reject a
plea bargain will be infrequently exercised and that this all or
nothing approach is a less successful means of controlling
prosecutorial discretion than a combined parole and sentencing
guideline system. '
The very complexity of drafting and implementing sentencing
guidelines cautions against abandoning the "safety net" provided
by the Parole Commission guidelines. Little if anything is known
abut how the sentencing commisson and guidelines will operate.
The more than 500 federal trial courts may be plagued with even
greater inconsistency in guideline scoring than the thirty-five parole hearing examiners. The reverse, of course, is possible and an
effective sentence guideline scheme may render superfluous certain
aspects of the parole function. However, as the American Bar Association has noted, "removing the safety net should be the last
step, not the first."19 8
The abolition of the Parole Commission may also be unwise in
that it would dismantle an agency capable of developing and analyzing valuable postsentence data concerning offenders. Concededly, the current parole system is not based upon a rehabilitative

DUCING DISPARITIES, supra note
PRmTs vol. II, at 44; Schulhofer,

191, at 19-20; McCall, supra note 33, at 6; SELECTED REsupra note 6, at 742-57; Tjoflat, supra note 170, at 618-24.
See also Alschuler, supra note 6, at 566-67; Bazelon, supra note 170, at 68-69; Coffee, supra
note 170, at 979-80 & n.15; Crump, Determinate Sentencing: The Promises and Perils of
Sentence Guidelines, 68 Ky. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1979).
196. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 176, at 1335; S. 2572, supra note 171, tit. V,sec. 507, §
994(a)(2)(D); S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. M, sec. 126, § 994(a)(2)(D). S. 1630 also includes a
proposed amendment to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to clarify the
court's power to reject a bargain covering withholding of charges as well as one involving
dismissal. S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. II, sec. 111(h)(2).
197. The combined sentence guideline/parole system was recommended and approved
by the House Judiciary Committee in its report on the Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980,
and was incorporated in one of the first code revision bills introduced in the 97th Congress.
See H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 176, at 509, 513; H.R. 1647, supra note 171, tit. I, §§
4301-4306, 4701-4717. Accord SENTENCING ALTERNATIES, supra note 83, commentary at 514.
198. SENTENCING ALTERNATlVE, supra note 83, commentary at 9.
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model and places slight weight upon institutional progress. Nevertheless, at present, modest advances in a presumptive parole date
are possible for inmates demonstrating superior program achievement, and individuals who violate institutional rules may have release dates extended. 199 Even presumptive sentence systems have
seen a need to consider institutional behavior and provide a limited incentive for inmates to obey institution rules.2 0 0 If prison progress is to be considered, the Parole Commission is arguably an
appropriate agency to find the relevant facts.
The Parole Commission, if retained, would also be available to
view postincarceration behavior in the event that future studies of
institutional behavior validate its utility as a predictive device. If
the Commission's knowledge of the effects of institutional programs improves, it would be able to add criteria to its guidelines
which consider institutional behavior. The author is mindful of the
wealth of criticism which argues that rehabilitation, even if measurable, should not affect an inmate's release date. 0 1 However, if
courts and commissions are willing to consider a defendant's prior
record to determine the appropriate duration of incapacitation, it
is difficult to see the unfairness in considering, as well, a defendant's institutional behavior, so long as the standards used to measure rehabilitation are public and fairly administered.
CONCLUSION

There are few areas of the law where fashions seem to change
more rapidly than in sentencing. It has been only thirty years since
the enactment of the Youth Corrections Act, perhaps the highwater mark of rehabilitative sentencing. Yet today there is almost
universal agreement that the rehabilitative experiment has failed.
Research in the next thirty years may demonstrate, however, that
there is some empirical method of measuring rehabilitation. It is
more likely that we may decide to increase our emphasis on institutional behavior if our experience in the next decade with guideline sentences convinces us that we are no more able to measure
the magic just desert or the magic period of incapacitation than we
were able to measure the magic moment of rehabilitation under

199. See supra note 48-53 and accompanying text.
200. Thus, the Senate's sentencing commission proposals provide that a prison term can
be reduced by up to 10% per year by receipt of "good time," S. 2572, supra note 171, tit. V,
sec. 502, § 3624(b); S. 1630, supra note 171, tit. I, § 3824(b).
201. See supra notes 2, 23 & 24.
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the previous model.
If parole is maintained, recent experience suggests that changes
need to be made in the Parole Commission factfinding process.
The Commission has acknowledged that it is dependent upon the
information developed at sentencing1 2 Accordingly, reform must
begin at the sentencing hearing.
Two revisions of current sentencing practice would help accomplish more accurate guideline decisions. First, procedures should
be established requiring evidentiary hearings at sentencing on any
contested factual assertions in the PIR which were not resolved by
the trial or plea. Appropriate procedures should include, at a mini-

mum, the opportunity to present evidence and to call witnesses not
protected by a legitimate claim of privilege.201 At the close of the
hearing, the court should be required to make findings on all contested facts. Moreover, inasmuch as the PIR is a court document,
the court should not be able to avoid deciding factual issues relevant to parole by disclaiming reliance on the PIR and moving the
factfinding responsibility to the Parole Commission.
Second, after the factual determinations have been made, they

should be communicated to the Parole Commission. The transcript
of the sentencing hearing should be included in every case as a
part of the parole file. The trial court should be required to communicate its view of the relevant facts and appropriate punishment to the Commission.204

202. See H.R. 5703, supra note 171, tit. I, § 3105; H.R. 5679, supra note 171, tit. I, §
3105; H.R. 1647, supra note 171, tit. I, § 3105; H.R. 4711, supra note 171, tit. I, § 3105. The
House proposals require the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine any unresolved issue of fact "essential" to the sentencing decision. The proposals differ regarding
the standard used by the court to rule on requests by the parties to subpoena, call and
cross-examine witnesses. Compare H.R. 5703, supra note 171, tit. I, } 3105(b)(1) (court
"shall permit the parties to subpoena, call and cross-examine witnesses.
. unless the court
determines that the information provided is not significant or that good cause exists for
nondisclosure of the source of information") with H.R. 5679, supra note 171, tit. I, §
3015(b)(1) (court "may permit the parties to subpoena, call and cross-examine witnesses").
The House Committee, considering the 1980 version of the reform bill, declined to adopt a
rule which would have guaranteed parties a fixed right to subpoena witnesses and documents after the Department of Justice "persuasively argued that there were situations
where it would be inappropriate to require Government informants as witnesses." H.R. Rap.
No. 1396, supra note 176, at 445. See also SzNTENCING ALTzRNATivzS, supra note 83, §§ 185.5, 18-6.4.
203. In this respect, the author's suggestions differ from the House of Representatives
criminal code revision proposals, which contemplate an evidentiary hearing and findings
only for those issues "essential" to the sentencing proceeding itself. See supra note 202.
204. See H.R. 5703, supra note 171, tit. I, § 3105(c)(2)(E); H.R. 5679, supra note 171, tit.
I, § 3105(c)(2)(E) ("[Tihe court shall assure that any finding of fact by the court that ne-
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Finally, if the Commission is to retain a guideline determining
function, it is essential that hearing examiners continue their efforts to become more proficient in guideline application. In a sense,
the Commission, in 1972, traded its expertise in gauging rehabilitation for its expertise in guideline application. While the Commission has worked long and hard to prove that its assumption of expertise in guideline imposition is more warranted than was its
assumption of expertise in judging rehabilitation, much obviously
remains to be done.
EPELOGUE

The Parole Commission's efforts to refine its decision-making
continue. After this article was completed, the Commission published a final rule adopting a number of major alterations to the
guidelines. 20 6 The revision, effective January 31, 1983, expands 6the
offense severity scale from its current seven levels to eight.20 It
also redesignates the offense severity categories from their present
descriptive labels to a numerical listing, with "category 1" representing the lowest severity, "category 8" the greatest.207 Of most
significance, the revision includes in the severity table a number of
formerly unlisted offense severity examples and defines more specifically certain listed offenses. 20 8 The new offense severity table
thus reduces the vaguenes in guideline criteria described earlier in
this article.'09 The Commission's revision, set forth in part in Appendix I, is a significant response to some of the recent criticism of
its decision-making.

gates a factual statement in the presentence report is made a part of such report.").
205. 47 Fed. Reg. 56,334-42 (1982).
206. Id. at 56,335-36.

207. Id.
208. Id. at 56,335-41.
209. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX I

GUIDELINES FOR DECISION-MAKING (effective 1/31/83)
(Guideline for decialon-mltiog. custonarY total time to be served before release (including Pattime))

Offense chaateistcs: Severity of offense behavior

Offender characteristics: Parole prognose
(salient factor score 19861)
Fair PoWr
Very Good Good
(10-8)

(7-6)

Months

Months

(5-4)

(3-0)

Months

Months

Category 1 (emamly "low severity"):

9-12
12-16
<-6
6-9
Adut range ....................................................................................................

(< 6)
(6-9) (9-12) (12-16)
(Youth range) ....................................................................................
Category 2 (formerly "tow mowerate severWIy"):
12-16
16-22
.8
-12
Adultrange ....................................................................................................
(<83
(8-12) (12-16) (16-20)
(Youth range) ....................................................................................
Category 3 (formerV "moderate eve 'lt")
18-24
24-32
10-14
14-18
A t range.....................................................................................
(20-26)
(6-12) (12-16) (16-20)
(Youth range) ....................................................................................
Category 4 (frmerly "high averty")
34-44
14-20
20-26 26-34
Aduit r ge ....................................................................................................
(12-16) (16-20) (20-26) (26-32)
(youth range)
..................................................................................................
Catg
(tormerly "very hO sevOy'
36-48
48-60
60-72
24-36
........
.
.......................................................
AdultIl . .
(20-26) (26-32) (32-40) (40-48)
(Youth range) ....................................................................................
Category a (formey 'Greatet I sevetyn:
64-78
76-100
40-52
5244
Adut range ......................................................................................
. (30-40) (40-50) (50-60) (60-76)
(Youth range) ....................................................................................
Category 7 (forel Included In "Greatest 11sevefty".
64-92 7-110 100-148
52-80
Adultrange ......................................................................................
(Youth range) ................................................ (40-64) (50-74) (60-86) (76-110)
Category 8 (formerly Included in "Greateat IIseverity"):
120-t
ISO .
180 t
100 j
....................................................................................................
Adultr
100*)
120f)
(150 )
(80 0)
(Youth range)...................................................................................................
NOTE:For Category Eight. no upper klitare speafied due to the extreme variability ofthe cases within this category. For
declelons
esceedi
the o
limito the a=
guidoline category by more than 48 months, thopertinent eggravating
case factors =onsieed er to be specilied inthe reasons en (e.g..that a homicide was premeditated or committed during
lywas deritonstrsted).
the coure of another felony. or that extreme coruelty or
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ADULT

GumIDluN

II

FOR PAROLE DI

ioNouAmuNo

Offender chanrcterhttms-parle prognosis (SF 81) (alient factorscoe)
Otrea ch. ateristias-severity of offen, behavior
(example)

Very good

Pair (5-41

Cood (74)

Poor (C")

(10-8)

Alcolhoor cigarette law violation, including tamevasin (amont of
ta evadedlena than 200D).'
Gambling lawviolations (no managerialor proprietary interest).
Illicit drugs, simple posmmion
...... .......................
Marihuana/huhiah. posession with intent to distribute/ ee very
small scalo (e.g..lessthan 10 Il. of mrihumnales
than I lb. oll

9 6 ra o .....

6 to 9 mo .....

9 to 12 mo ...

8 mu

8 to 12m-

12 to 16 me

12 to 1g m a

haohinh/lm than .01 lilar of hanh or),.

Property ol'ena (theft, incometan ev-ion. or simple p(--e-ion of
stolen property) less than I2.000.

Low Moderate
Counterfeit currency
or other medium of exchange[(paeing/
poseniuon)
im than $2.M).
Drug (other than specifically categorized),pternnion with intent to
distribute/eale [very snall scale (eg., lessthan 200dosea.
Marihuana/hahish. lpossesion with intent to distribute/ ee [emall
orate(eg., 10-49lbs. of marihuana/1-4.9 Ib. huahiah/.01-.04
litem
of hah oil)).
Cocaine.posession with intent to ditriute/ale [woryamll ae
k
(e.g., leasthan I gramof 100', purity, or equivalent amount)].
Gambling lawviolationa-mangerial or proprietary interest in
oall scale operation [e.g.. Sports books(estimated daily grow
less than 05,000);Homebeoka(estimated daily grossless than
1,M0); Numbers bankers(intimateddaily grosslem than 0760)].
Immigration law violations ..........
Property offensm(forgery/fraud/theft from mail/embelement/
intetate traroportation of stolen or forgedeecuritie/r'eiving
stolen property with intent to reel) Ime than 2.0(0.

o

16 to 22 me.

Moderate
Automobile theft (3 cam,or leasinvolved and total valuedoesnot
exceed $19.999P.
Counterfeit currency or other medium of exchange[(paessin/
posession) $2.00D-4119.9991.
Drugp(other than specifically categorized),poeesion with intent to
distribute/,Wle small sate (eg,, 200-999 dree)l.
Marihuans/aahiah. possession with intent to distribute/ Wl
[medium scate (e.g., 0-199 lb. of marihmna/5-19.9 (be.of
hahah/.05-.19 liters of hsb ol)].
Cocaine. posession
with intent to distribute/la Ismail acale(e4g.
1.0-4.9gramsof 100, purity, or equivalent smount).
Opiates.possession
with intent to distribute/asae evidenceof opiate
addiction and very small scale (e4.. lon than 1.0 rms of 0Oo%,
pumre
heroin, or equivalent amount).
Firearms Act, poseaeion/purchase/sale (singlewexpun: not swedoff eshtgunor machinegun).
Gambling lawviolation-managerial or proprietary interest in
medium scale operation [eg.. Spurtsbook,(estimated daily grow
5.000-115,000); Hoee booka(estimated daily grow 1150004,000);Numbers bankers(estimated daily go V780-12,000)
I.
Property offenas (thaft/forgery/fraud/embetlementAntentte
transprtation of stolen or forgedrecuritia/inrom tax evasion/
receiving stolen property) 02.000-19.9.
Smuggtingjtraeporting of aelln(() .........

Seefootnote at endo( table.

10 to 14 me

14t

IS

m

0 to 24 m

24 to .
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ADULT GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE DacIBoNMuAmN-Continued
Offender characterktim-poule prugnoom (SFS 81) (saient factor as)
Offecme characteriotics-severity of offense behavior

Very good

(examples)

C msu kn x. ~

......

Good(74)

Fai (54

Poo (30

...................................

Counterfeit currency or other medium
of exchange (pasing/
posemion) $2D.000-$100.001.
Counterfeiting imanufwcturing (amount of counterfeit currency or
other medium of exchange involved not exceeding $100000)j.
Drugs (other than speciflcall listed). pxsesion with intent to
distribute/de Imedium wale (eg., 1000-19.999 dma)].

Marihuena/hashish. pamemion with intent to distribute/ale [larg
rale(eg., 200-1999 IL of marihua/ 20-199 lb of haohish/.2
1.99 liters of hanhoil)).
Cocaine.poseaaion with intent to diotribute/ale Imedium scale
(e.g. 5-99grumaof 100' purity, or equivalent tmont).
Opiates. posession with intent to distributesale [=arl scale(e4.,
less than 5 raensof 300. pureheroin, or equivlent amount)
except as described in moderate!.
>_
Firearma Act, poeoesion/purchae/sale (sawsd-off shotgun(s),
machine gun(s), or multiple weapons).
Gasmbliglaw violations-mangerial or proprietary interet in large
scale operation (eg., Sportsbooka(eststed daily g
mom
than $SISA0); Hore books(estinsted daily grm more than
$4,000);Numbers bankers (estimated daily om mors then
$2,000)).
Involuntary manslaughter (eg., negligent hmacide ..
.
Mann Act (no force-cmmecial purposes) ........
Property offenses(theft/forgery/fraud/embezlementfmtesate
trssportation of stolen or forgedscuritics/inoome tax evasion/
receiving stolen property) 920,000-$100.900.
Ttreatening communications (e.g.,mil/phone-not forpurpmenof
extortion and noother overt act.

14 to 20 me

20 to 2 mo..

2to34 moo,..

34 to 44 moo.

48 to 60 mo..

60 to 72 c,

Very High
Robbery-(

or 2 in tanc s) ...

..........

...

..........

Breaking end entering-rmory with intent to steal weapons.
Breaking and entering/urglary-residence: or breaking and
entering of other premises with hostile confrontation with victios.
Counterfeit currency or ether medium of excharge 1(smng/
psasemmon/manufacturing) amount more than 910000 but nod
exceeding $590.O00)l
Drop (other then specifically listed). posmein with intent to
distribute/sale [Ilarge scale (eg.. 20.000 or more draes) exept as
described in Greatest 11.
Marihuna/nhih.

pasession with intent to distribute/sol

Ivery

large sale (eg., 2,000 Ih. or mere of marihuans/200 Ihe. or mare
of hashhn [iters or more of hash oil)].

>m

Cocaine. posmesionwith intent to distribute/sale
sale
Klarge
(04,
100 gram or mom of 100
purity, or equivalent amount) except
s described in Greatest I.
Opiates, possemion with intent to ditribut / ale [medium to a very
large scale (eg., 5 gram. or sore of 100'

pure herein. or

equivalent smont) unless the offense is described in Greatest I
or Greatest II).
Extortion [threst of physicalharm (to person or propertyll.
Exposive, passaion/transportation .................

.

Property offenses (theft/orgery/fraud/embezzlementmterstate
transportation o stolen or forged acuritmatie

me tax evssion/
receiving stolen property) more than SI00,000 but not eanseding
$500.000.

San footnote at endof table.

24 to .8

oo.

36to48mo

.
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DwCISIONMAKImG-Contnlued

Offender characteriotirs-parole prognoais
(SF8 91) (salient factorscare)
Offense characteristics-.everity of offense behavior

Verygood

(exampls)

(10-8)

Great 17-)
1

Poor(3-0)

Fai (54
1

at

1

_

Gretat I
Aggravated felony (eg., robbery; weapon fired or injury of a type
normally requiring medica attention).
Armon or exposive detonation [involving potential risk (f physical
injury to person(s) (e.g., promies occupied or likely to be
occupied)-no serious injury occurredl.
Drop (other then specifically listed), prasesion with intent to
distribute/sale Imangeria or proprietary interest and very large
scale (eg., offense involving more than 200.000 doea)].
Cocaine, possesnion with intent to distribute/ae Imanagerial or
proprietary interest and very large scale (eg., offense involving
more than I kilogr om rf 1001. purity, or equivalent anat).
Opiates, posseion with intent to distribute sale Imanagerial or

40 to 52 mo

52 to 64 mo

64 to 78 maj

78 to 100m o,

proprietary interest and large scale (e.g., odfense involving more
than 50 grams but not more than I kilogram (1OO grama) of
100% pure heroin or equivalent amiount)!.
Kidnaping [other than listed in Greatest II; limited duration; and
no harm to victim (e.g., kidnaping the driver of a truck during a
hijacking, driving him to a secluded location, and releasing victim

unh.rmed)l.
Robbery (3 or 4 instances)

.........

.

........

Sea act-force [e.g., forcible rape or Mann Act (force)]..! .

Greatest II
Murder ............

.. ..........

.....

Voluntary manslaughter ...
Aggravated felony-serious injury (e.g.. robbery; injury involving
substantial risk of death, or protracted disability, or
disfigurement) or extreme cruelty/brutality toward victim.
Aircraft hijacking .......

........

.....

Espionage .............
Opiates, possession with intent to distribute/sole Imnnagerial or
proprietary interest and very large scale (e.g., offense involving
more than I kilngram (1000 gran) of 100',. pure heroin or
equivalent anount)].
Kidnaping (for ransom or terrorism; as hrtage; or berm to victim)

T remon ..................
.....
..... ..

......

52+mo

64+mo .......

78+mo .......

100+mo.

Specific upper limits are not provided due to the limited number of
roses and the extreme variation pomsiblewithin category.
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momsONmAmuNO

Offender characteriati-paroe prognmi(SFS 81)(salient factor s0or)
Olffea chara eristics-everity of offensebehavior
(examples)

Good(7-6)

Very good

Far 5-4)

Poor (3-0)

(10-8)

lawviolations, including tax evasion (amount of
or cigarette
Alcohol
taxevadedlcothan $2,000).'
Gambling lawviolationa (nomanagprial or proprietary interest).
p .eaio ..............................
Illicit
drugs, simple
ime .......6 to 9 mo..
ery
with intent to diotuibute/ al
Marihuana/hashiah. pameoaion
(eg.. less than 10lha. of marihana/lem than I l. of
amaUlscale
than .01 liter of hah oil~l.
hashiah/leha
Property olfenm (theft, incometaxevasion.or simple posession of
stolen property) lessthan 20W0.

9 to 12 mo .... 12to 16ma

Low Moderate
Counterfeit curmncyorother medim of exchange I(pasaing/
p wo)
.
6. than s2,00.0
with intent to
possession
categorized),
Drop (other than pecrifically
distribute/sale verysmall scale(e.g.,Iesthan 200dom)lj.
Marihoana/hashish, possession with intent to distribute/ We [small
10-49lhi. of marihuana/l-4.9 lbs.hashish/.Ot-.04 liters
scale(eg.,
of hashoil)].
Cocaine, possesion with intent to distribute/aals (very small acae
(e4., les than I grean of lO'. purity, or equivalont amountl.
Gambling law viotatkn-mnaagerial 0r proprietary interest in
boolis (inated daily grm
sale operation e-g.. Sport@
small
lea than $5,000); Horsebohs (estimated daily pm lcs than
lessthan $750)1.
SI00); Numbers bankers (eatimated daily gross
.......
......
.......
Immigration law violation ............
(foriery/fraoud/theft frommail/embezzleoeent/
Property offesnes
interstate transportation of stolen orfogedscurities/rceiving
e.
stolen property with intent to resell)lossthan $2.000.

em .....

8 to 12 .o .

12to16 mo.

16to 2Dm

Moderate
involved andtotal value doesnot
Automobile theft (3 carsor less
exceed $19,999).
Counterfeit currency or other medium of exchange((passing/
posesion ) $2.)0-$19,99](.
Dro (other than specifically categarizad).possession with intent to
200-999dssz)j.
diatibte/oale Ismall ace (eg.,
poession with intent to distribute/ sale
Marihoanathashiosh
Imedium scale(eg., 50-199 l1 of marihUana/-19.9 Ib.of
hashish/.t0-.19 liters of has oill.
Cocaine.posmaeion with intent to distribut/asle amell sale (e.g.
amount)].
1.0-4.9gramsof 10(.. purity, orequivalent
of opiate
(evidence
with intent to distribute/sale
Opiates. posoesnion
los than 1.0gramsof 100'.
addictionand verysmall scale (eg..
pore heroin, or equivalent amountl.
(single weapon,not awedAct.poessmion/purchaae/sale
Firearmso
offshotgun or machine goo).
Gambling law violatiorta-manageial or proprietary interest in
medium seek operation eg.. Spartaboola (estimated daily pm
$5(A00-I010. );Horsehook (estimated daily pss $1,X04.000); Numbers banke (estimated daily pm Sr50-$2,00)1.
Property offenses(theft/forgery/fraud/embholema t/intemtate
transportation of stolen or forgedseuitie/ncone tex evtoBi/
receiving stolen property) $2.000-19.999.
..........
Smuggling/tranopertin of alien(o)....

S.e footnote at end of table.

8 to 12 m

.

12 to 16 ma

16 to 20 mo.

20 to26mo

Federal Parole and Sentencing

19821

719

Yourr/NARA Guwmmu ion Dz1=o NmAD-b-Continued
Oifendsr charactaintim-psrole progsoal (Bs at) (salient facto sors)
Offense characterntics-severity of offense behavior

Verygond

(examples)

(104)91

Good(7.4)

1

Fai ("

Poor( -)

High
Carnal knowledge
.......................................
Counterfeit currency or other medium of exchange (passing/
posennion) $20.o0-$100.o00J.
Counterfeiting (manufacturing (amount of counterfeit currencyor
other medium of exchange involved not exceeding $100.000)I.
Drugs (other than specifically listed), possessionwith intent to
distribute/sale [medium scale (eg.. 1.000-19,9 doses)].
Msrihuana/iashisb. possoesionwith intent to distribute/sale Ilarge
scale (eg.. 200-1,999 lbs. of marihuan/ 20-199 lbs. of hashisl.201.99 liters of hash oil)).
Cocaine. possession with intent to distribute/sale [medium scale
(e.g.. 5-99 grass of t001,- purity, or equivalent

ommt)].

Opiates. paesoion with intent to distribute/sale [small scale 4e.,
less than 5 gras of 100.

pure heroin, or equivslent amount)

except as described in moderate).
Firearms Act. posaesion/purcha-esale (sawed-of shotmgn(s).

>

12 to 16 sa.

16 to 2D mo.

20to2

me...

26 to .12 ma.

machine gun(s), or multiple weapons).
Gambling Law violation--managerial or proprietery interest in egrp
wale operation [e.g.. Sports books (estimated daily gros more
than $15.000): Horse hooks (etimated daily gross more than
$4.DD); Numbers benkern (etimated daily gras more than
$2000)1.
Involuntary manslaoghter (e.g., negligent homicide) ..............
Mann Act (no force-commercial purposes) ..........
Property offemes (theft/for"ery/fraud/embeazlement/interstat
transportation of stolen or forged seartiesnsome tax oveas
receiving stolen property) $20,000-10,0l0.
Threatening communications (e.g., mail/phone-not for purposes of
extortion snd no other overt act.

Very High
Robbery-(I or 2 instance) .......
......
Breaking and entering-armory with intent to steal weapons.
Breaking and enterinoburglary-residence; or breaking sad
entering of other premias with hostile confrontation with victim.
Counterfeit currency or other medium of exchalng )(paesing/
piaession/manufacturing) amount more than 8100,000 but not
exceeding $00,00)]
Marilusna/hasih, poss sion with intent to distribute/sale Ivery
large sae (eg.. 2,000 lbs or more of m-rihuana/200 lbs. or more
of hashish/2 liters or more of hab oil)J.
Cocaine. psesasion with intent to distribute/sale [large mcsl (seg,
100 gramsor more of 100'

purity, or equivalent amount) except

a described in Greatest I.
Opiates. posesion with intent to distribute/sale Imedium to a very
large scale (e.g.. 5 grams or mor of 100S pure heroin, or
equivalent amount) unles the offense is deacribed in Greatest I
or Greatest Ill.
Extortion Ithreat of physical harm (to person or property)).
Explosives. poseion/transportation ....................
Property offenses (theft/forgery/frssd/embaslement/interstete
transportatin of stolen or forged ecurite

ncom

tee

on/

receiving stolen property) more than 1t,000 but not exceeding
$50000f

See footnote at end of table.

2D0to 26 a

2 to 2 mo .

.l2 to 40 mo

40 to 48 mo.
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Offender cheracteristics-parole prognosis (SPS 81) (slient factor score)
Offense characteritic-eeverity of offennebehavior

Very goad

(examples)

Good(7-)

ir-)

Poor13.0)

Greatest I
Aggravated felony (eg., robbery;

epon fired or injury of a type

normally requiring medical attention).
Arasun o exploive detomation [involving potential risk of physical
injury to pernon(s)(eg.. premises occupied or likely to be
orrupied)-no serious injury occurred).
Drugs (other then specifically listed). posseaion with intent to
(managerial or proprietary interest and very large
scale (e.g., offense involving more than 200.000 doa)li.
distributeaetl

Cocaine, poeaesaion with intent to distribute/sale (managerial or
proprietary interest and very large scale (e.g., offense involving
more than I kilogram of 100', purity, or equivalent amount).

ID to 40 mo

Opiates. pomassin with intent to diatributa sale (managerial or
proprietary interest and large sale (eg., offeme involving more

40 to 50 m

-

50 to 60 mo.

60 to 76 m.

than 50 grams but not more than I kilogram (1000 grams) of
1OP pure heroin or equivalent amount)].
Kidnaping (other than listed in Greatast I; limited duratiom; and
no harm to victim (e-g.. kidnaping the driver of a truck during a
hijacking. driving him to a excluded location, and releasing victim
anharmedl].
Robbery (3 or 4 imntances) ........
.
.........
Sea act-folce [e-g.. forcible rape or Mann Act (force)J......

Greatest II

Murder ... .

.....

... ........

Voluntary manslaughter ............
Aggravated felony-serioms injury (eg., robbery; injury involving
substantial risk o death, or protracted disability, or
disfigurement) or extreme cruelty/brutality toward victim.
Aircraft hijacking
..........
.....
.......
Espionage
..........
Opiates. posssion with intent to distribute/le (managerial or

40+mo

S0+to
60+o
76+mpecific upper limit. are not provided due to the limited number of
ca aad
n the extreme variation posible within category.

praprietary interest and large scale (eg., offense involving more
than 50 gram but mit more than I kilogram (1000 grams) of
I0'
pure heroin or equivalent amount)).
Kidnaping (for rammnnor terrorism; as hostage; or harm to victim).
T reason ....

....

......

........

. ......

Alcohol or cigarette tax law violations involving $2.000 or more of evade4 tax shall be treated as a property offense (tax evaion).
Except that automobile theft (not kept more than 72 hours; no substantial damage; and not theft for resale) shall be rated as low severity.
Automobile theft involving a value of more than $19,99 shall be treated as a property offense. In addition. automobile theft involving more than I
cars, regardlss of value, ahall he treated as no les than high severity.
Except
o
that carnal knowledge in which the rlationship is clearly voluntary, the victim i. not less than 14 years old. and the age difference
between offender and victim in tea than four years shall be rated a a low severity ofeme.

